Assad’s invisible hand
Countering the regime’s dismissal of transitional justice

‘Innovative’ accountability is the West’s go-to instrument when it comes to advancing transitional justice in Syria. To this end, the West has supported the work of Syrian NGOs such as the Syrian Network for Human Rights, international organisations such as the Centre for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA), and UN bodies like the Commission of Inquiry, the Institution for Missing Persons, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM). These efforts maintain the pressure on Assad and his backers, support future Syrian legal proceedings and the few possible third country trials (mainly in Germany and France), and establish reference points for truth-seeking. Truth-seeking, however, goes beyond forensically establishing facts in a court of law; and it intersects with a reconciliation that aims to harmonise diverse truths and create a pluralistic consciousness of the past and present. Ideally resulting in a broad acceptance of accountability as a just measure, this holistic approach forms the basis of transitional justice, itself contributing to a non-retributive society capable of coming to terms with its past. 

Monopoly on truth
The Assad regime understands the importance of manipulating the three pillars of transitional justice (truth-seeking, accountability, reconciliation) and works at misusing them to reproduce its authoritarian rule. According to an informed source, in a meeting with the UN Special Envoy in 2022, Foreign Minister Faisal Mikdad expressed interest in learning more about the South African reconciliation process. He made sure to confine the conversation to reconciliation only, sidestepping the truth-seeking and accountability parts that formed the essence of the South African experience. The regime has twisted the term reconciliation to breaking point, treating it as an act of submission by a wayward individual to a beneficent master. Those offered reconciliation must sign a document denouncing so-called traitors and promising never again to rise up “against the state.” Reconciling with the state, however, does not equal safety. Different mukhabarat branches have their own lists of wanted persons, so rearrests are common. In Assad’s Syria, reconciliation is just a way of submitting to the regime's arbitrary justice – and for Syrians wishing to avoid exile, this is often the only viable option.   

Genuine and nation-wide reconciliation appears distant, given the ongoing conflict and a stalled political process. Growing up in a dictatorship with determined friend/enemy distinctions, and a state narrative of being in constant existential struggle with external enemies (Israel, Western imperialism), many Syrians unwillingly identify with the zero-sum logic that has been forced on them; and the gruesome events of the past 13 years surely have confirmed the self-fulfilling prophecy of existential war that the regime has promoted. Breaking free from this zero-sum mentality that rules out power sharing starts with developing a consciousness of how the regime fabricates reality.

The official narrative of the Islamist uprising in the late 1970s and early 1980s highlights the regime’s consistent portrayal of internal conflicts as the result of foreign plots aimed at plunging Syria into sectarian chaos. In a speech on 22 December 1979 Hafiz Assad categorised oppositionists as either misguided (and therefore salvageable) or serving foreign masters (rendering them beyond salvation.) Similarly, a speech by Bashar Assad on 17 July 2014 stressed how conspiratorial forces steered individuals down a destructive path, and framed unrestrained state violence as an inevitable (and therefore legitimate) response to an existential threat. Impunity gives rise to ideological-sectarian victim narratives, for example of Alawites facing Sunni partisans that are part of a regressive conspiracy supported by international Zionism and imperialist forces; which in turn nurtures Sunni Arab victim narratives of being at the mercy of tyrannical Alawite minority rule. Instead of engaging in a national dialogue about these issues, most Syrians remain silent, while others seek revenge through violence.  

The omnipresence of an existential threat has been foundational in the Baath Party’s political ideology. The climate of permanent enmity not only sustains authoritarianism but shapes social norms and practices that continue to affect the thought processes of Syrians everywhere. In regime areas, the prevalence of impunity and tight control over truth makes genuine reconciliation impossible — not least because the Assad family’s reign was never built on consensus or conciliation to begin with. Enmity between sectarian groups was a real phenomenon rooted in the Ottoman experience and intensified during the French Mandate. Successive governments of the 1946-1963 ‘bourgeois democracy’ period failed to implement any genuine nation-building programme, and the Assads would exploit this in their divide-and-rule games. The regime’s 1980 decision to grant legal impunity to members of the security forces was rooted in a genuine existential fear among Alawites that was used to justify extreme – and illegal – measures on grounds of communal self-preservation. The same logic holds true today. 

Beyond flawed reconciliation
The regime is smart enough to admit “mistakes” on rare occasions. In his July 2011 speech, Bashar acknowledged state wrongdoings related to the crackdown of the 1980s. He stated that, “generations are still paying the price for that period (…) We held certain individuals responsible for the mistakes of other individuals – which is not right.” However, this should not be construed as any genuine interest in truth-seeking, reconciliation, or accountability. Bashar’s admissions are confined to cases where individuals were denied government employment on political grounds, and similar cases where responsibility could easily be pinned on over-zealous bureaucrats. The aim was to deflect attention from the systemic violence unleashed by the political leadership. For the regime, such controlled criticism is what passes as a “national opposition.”

Another characteristic of the regime’s approach is its merciful attitude towards militants who submit, i.e “reconcile.” The offer of reconciliation comes with a promise of impunity, as long as the rebels – including those from arch-enemies like Islamic State and the Nusra-Front/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – pledge to conduct violence on behalf of the regime. This has been most evident in Daraa, scene of the 2018 large-scale “reconciliation” process. Structural impunity of this kind is causing future generations to be socialised in a culture of violence that perpetuates authoritarian social norms that may extend far beyond the lifetime of the Assad regime. 

The regime actively promotes this constructed reality to shape citizens into compliant entities of the ‘violent state.’ Understanding the necessity of maintaining this false reality, the regime carefully employs historical narratives in formal education programmes and social activities. Long-time presidential adviser Bouthaina Shaaban’s Al-Watan [“the nation”] Foundation aims to shape Syrian history by curating oral testimonies of loyalist suffering during the war. The dominant narrative in all these testimonies places the responsibility for violence entirely on external actors, stifling discourse on state violence and conflict within Syrian society. When the recognition of suffering becomes futile, and addressing guilt a social taboo, truth-seeking, reconciliation, and accountability become meaningless.   

To counter the regime’s core narrative of existential struggle, it is crucial to introduce inclusive narratives and practices that disrupt established patterns of thought. Early in the revolution, some Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) pursued this vision, but their idealism tended to paper over ethnic and sectarian divisions rather than overcome them. Today, with Syria effectively divided into three areas of control (Alawite, Sunni, Kurd), there is space to address the overdue question of national reconciliation i.e. nation-building. While calls for decentralisation are made by some advocacy groups, caution is warranted. It would replicate a tried-and-failed model implemented under the French Mandate; and it is unlikely that de-centralisation alone would be sufficient to end violent conflict. Focusing on governance in the peripheries while sidelining the crucial political question of the “centre“ may even exacerbate violence. The problem should be dealt with head on. Deeply-rooted ethnic and sectarian divides — often interlinking with class issues — that legitimise violence and encourage impunity should be discussed in an honest and serious manner. Syrians can start this process of seeking historical truth, advancing accountability, and reconciling among themselves within areas beyond Assad’s control, regardless of the regime’s or external actors’ engagement. Breaking free from the invisible chains of Baathist thought-control is the first step towards full-spectrum transitional justice.  

This is part II of a series of articles on advancing transitional justice in Syria. Find part I in the December 2023 issue.