A view from Ankara
A conversation with Erdem Ozan

In the wake of Assad’s fall, Turkey has emerged as the leading regional actor in Syria. As it seeks to maintain influence it must contend with a transitional government in Damascus keen to assert sovereignty and independence. Questions linger over Ankara’s continued support for armed factions, its stance toward Kurdish autonomy, and its long-term strategic vision for a country that, according to President Trump, it had “conquered.”  

To answer these questions, Syria in Transition spoke with Erdem Ozan, a recently retired Turkish diplomat of 27 years’ experience. He served as Ambassador to Jordan, and held postings in the UAE, Austria, France, and Nigeria. Between 2012 and 2024, he worked on Middle East affairs with a particular focus on Syria.

Over the years Turkey has provided a protective umbrella in northwest Syria which allowed HTS to consolidate and grow. As President Donald Trump put it, Turkey has “conquered” Syria. Given Ankara’s central role in toppling the Assad regime, and its territorial proximity, what kind of role does it envision for itself in post-Assad Syria? 
Ozan: In my opinion, Türkiye’s role in Syria has always been anchored in two strategic imperatives: ensuring national security through counterterrorism and facilitating the safe, voluntary return of Syrian refugees. These are not tactical aims; they are long-term state priorities, shaped by geographic proximity and social realities.

It is important to reject simplistic and provocative characterisations, such as referring to Türkiye’s involvement as “conquest.” Such language distorts the security-driven rationale of Türkiye’s actions and ignores the fact that its presence has prevented further destabilisation along NATO’s southeastern flank.

As the transitional leadership under Ahmad al-Sharaa attempts to establish legitimacy, Türkiye will naturally reassess its engagement. But it is clear that its involvement will remain structured, strategic, and multilateral, not interventionist. The often-fragmented international engagement with Syria — Jordan in the south, the US in the northeast, Türkiye in the north — has deepened the country’s fragmentation. In this light, I believe any future framework must be cohesive and inclusive if it hopes to succeed.

I would caution against overestimating Türkiye’s capacity or intention to act as the sole guarantor of Syria’s post-conflict order. The Syrian crisis is an international issue, and responsibility must be shared accordingly. While northern Syria has stabilised under Turkish protection, this was done out of necessity, not ambition. The so-called “umbrella” was, in fact, a security buffer for Türkiye, one that local actors benefited from. That principle will hopefully continue to define Türkiye’s posture in the region: defensive in purpose, stabilising in effect.

In Damascus today there are giant billboards thanking President Trump, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani for lifting sanctions and providing political and financial support but none thanking President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Why do you think that is? Is there a crisis of confidence between Ankara and Damascus? 
Ozan: In diplomacy, symbolism matters. But it should not be mistaken for substance. The absence of billboards thanking President Erdogan, in my view, is not reflective of Türkiye’s strategic relevance or the strength of its influence. Türkiye has consistently led regional efforts to advocate for sanctions relief and has pushed both Washington and Brussels to adopt more realistic, humanitarian-focused policies toward Syria. These initiatives have unfolded with the quiet consent and, at times, participation of Damascus.

I do not interpret the absence of visible gratitude as a sign of hostility or distrust. Instead, I see it as a reflection of domestic Syrian political choreography. Türkiye does not require symbolic affirmation to measure its role. Ankara’s strategic patience and pragmatic diplomacy have outlasted many of the rhetorical flourishes of the past decade.

That said, the political maturity and confidence between both sides will be tested as Syria transitions. I believe Damascus is still in a formative stage of redefining its institutional tone. It is clear to me that it has yet to internalise fully the norms of modern strategic communication. But I am optimistic that, over time, the Syrian government will align its messaging with the realities of regional interdependence.

According to our information, Turkey continues to pay the salaries of Syrian National Army (SNA) groups. This seems to run counter to the Sharaa government’s efforts to centralise military command under the Ministry of Defence. Would you see this as an active challenge to the Syrian government’s authority?
Ozan: In my view, this perception misinterprets the complex realities on the ground. Financial support to the SNA — or to any local structures — is not a declaration of opposition to Damascus. Instead, it reflects the transitional nature of the current Syrian landscape. Until state institutions are fully rehabilitated and inclusive, external support — whether from Türkiye, the Gulf, or Europe — will remain a necessary and unfortunate measure for ensuring local stability.

We must also acknowledge that the political and military architecture of northern Syria today is, to a significant degree, the product of Türkiye’s decade-long engagement. Without Türkiye’s logistical and political support, the transitional authorities would face a far more precarious environment. In that sense, Ankara’s role is not antagonistic but contributory, albeit carefully managed.

The Sharaa administration must recognise that legitimacy cannot be claimed solely through military centralisation. The deeper challenge lies in achieving political inclusivity, ensuring institutional transparency and maintaining balanced and good governance. From my perspective, the new leadership still operates within a heavily centralised framework, with disproportionate influence wielded by HTS-linked actors. This reality underscores the urgency of implementing structural reforms, not merely cosmetic gestures of unity.

Unless Syria’s transition addresses the systemic exclusion of key constituencies, including Alawites, Kurds, and Arabs, state consolidation will remain fragile. In that context, Türkiye’s pragmatic engagement should be viewed as a stabilising factor, not a challenge to sovereignty. 

Since the fall of Assad you've written extensively on Syria. Your most recent article published on CNN criticised what you considered to be the performative attempt at building state institutions. How do you assess the challenge of state building in Syria today given that the government lacks the financial means to implement real and deep reforms? 
Ozan: State-building in Syria today faces two fundamental challenges: financial constraints and a governance model that prioritises control over systemic transformation. Economic difficulties certainly limit the scope of reforms. The deeper issue lies in governance itself. How is power structured, distributed, and legitimised? Sharaa’s administration has yet to translate symbolic gestures into genuine institutional development. So far, it has preferred to rely on centralised authority rather than promoting inclusivity and institutional resilience.

This pattern reminds me of flawed transitions in post-conflict states, where political elites consolidate power under the banner of reform but fail to implement meaningful structural change. A notable example is Sierra Leone’s post-civil war reconstruction, where financial injections and international backing supported institution-building, yet governance remained elite-driven, centralised, and resistant to reform. Similarly, post-Soviet states, such as Georgia and Ukraine, faced prolonged instability due to transitions that strengthened existing political factions rather than fostering broad-based institutional legitimacy.

Recent initiatives, such as the National Commission for Missing Persons and the National Transitional Justice Commission, represent initial steps toward reform. However, these bodies risk becoming performative unless transparency, institutional checks, and genuine public engagement accompany them. Transitional justice must be more than a procedural formality. Without credibility, it becomes a mechanism of control rather than a tool for national reconciliation.

If power remains narrowly concentrated, Syria risks following the path of fragile post-conflict states, where initial stabilisation solidifies into long-term authoritarianism under a new guise. 

The Turkish government has recently softened its rhetoric toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF.) A ceasefire is in place, and direct talks are happening. How do you interpret this shift, especially in light of the broader peace process with the PKK? Could Ankara ultimately become the guarantor of a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in northeast Syria?
Ozan: This remains a highly dynamic and sensitive debate in Türkiye. The Turkish government’s rhetorical shift seems to be a strategic recalibration rather than a significant policy reversal. This adjustment is closely tied to Ankara’s broader Kurdish reconciliation process. Developments on one front will inevitably affect the other. If Türkiye’s dialogue with the PKK stalls or collapses, engagement with the SDF will likely follow suit, given their interconnected role in Ankara’s security calculus and regional positioning.

Yet, significant domestic political constraints remain. Ankara has long framed the SDF as an extension of the PKK, rejecting its legitimacy as a Kurdish political representative. After years of reinforcing this narrative, any perceived tolerance for Kurdish autonomy risks provoking a strong backlash from Turkish nationalists and Syrian Arabs. The government faces a delicate balancing act between securing its strategic interests and ensuring that engagement with the SDF does not alienate nationalist voters ahead of key political milestones.

Meanwhile, the March 10 agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF raises more questions than answers. The planned integration of the SDF into Syria’s armed forces may be symbolic rather than substantive, with unresolved issues around command structures, operational control, and governance. Post-conflict transitions often struggle with military absorption. Iraq’s militia integration and Libya’s failed security unifications serve as cautionary precedents. If Türkiye perceives this agreement as mere optics rather than a genuine consolidation of Syrian authority, its engagement strategy could shift once again.

One particularly notable shift is Mazlum Abdi’s role in the agreement. For the first time, he participated in an official political capacity to negotiate Kurdish constitutional rights with the Syrian President. This signals the growing institutionalisation of Kurdish leadership within Syria. This presents Ankara with a dilemma: will it continue to view Abdi and the SDF solely through a security lens, or will it begin recognising their evolving political role?

Beyond Kurdish dynamics, Arab tribal grievances in eastern Syria could prove pivotal. Previous tensions over forced conscription and governance structures have alienated local Arab populations. These unresolved issues may resurface now that the SDF is formalising its political role. If Arab communities reject Kurdish dominance, it could undermine the legitimacy of the Syrian agreement and complicate Türkiye’s calculations, especially if instability creates opportunities for rival actors to exploit tribal divisions.

If Ankara successfully neutralises PKK-linked security concerns, engagement with the SDF could evolve into a long-term security arrangement rather than outright confrontation.

Finally, what do you think is most misunderstood in today’s policy discourse on Syria?
Ozan: In my opinion, the most fundamental misunderstanding is the conflation of external recognition with domestic legitimacy. A transitional leader cannot gain true authority through international photo ops or donor conferences. Legitimacy must come from within, from the trust of the Syrian people that the leadership can govern inclusively, reconcile past injustices, and chart a credible path forward. Without this foundation, even the most carefully curated transitions risk collapsing under skepticism.

A coherent political narrative is essential to clarifying these misunderstandings. Without a strategy that resonates across fragmented constituencies, legitimacy remains contested, and external actors dominate policy discourse. Legitimacy cannot be imposed. It must be built through governance that reflects local realities and fosters trust beyond security calculations.

Similarly, Syria’s reconstruction is often misunderstood as a financial effort rather than a political process. International actors frame rebuilding in economic terms while ignoring how reconstruction decisions reinforce control, patronage, and power consolidation. If recovery efforts only strengthen loyalist networks while marginalising others, they will entrench divisions rather than rebuild national cohesion.

Transitional justice is another overlooked factor. Without meaningful accountability mechanisms, unresolved grievances persist, increasing the risk of instability. Lessons from Bosnia, Iraq, and Lebanon show that ignoring past injustices leads to cycles of unrest. Stability isn’t just about security. It’s about ensuring communities feel included in governance.

Syria’s future is not just a choice between stability and collapse. It remains fluid, contested, and shaped by competing forces. Without a strong political narrative and meaningful reforms, misunderstandings will persist. These misunderstandings will allow external actors to dictate Syria’s trajectory rather than the Syrian people themselves. For more than a decade, ‘legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people’ was the motto of the opposition. Now is the time to bring this vision to life.