Double or quits
Syria’s leader flirts with Moscow as he decides whether to fight or talk

Nine months in, Ahmad al-Sharaa’s leadership of Syria faces an acute crisis. His promise to unify the country under his authority was initially hailed by Sunni Arab constituencies and regional patrons, particularly Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Circumstances, however, have intervened. Sharaa’s inability to foster genuine inclusivity, compounded by bouts of sectarian violence, has driven the Druze to cut loose with Damascus. In doing so, they have followed the path blazed by the Kurds, who over the past decade have carved out self-rule in northeastern Syria.

The Druze are now pushing to establish their own autonomous region in the south. Their efforts have been bolstered by support from Israel, which has long harboured an interest in Syria’s territorial fragmentation. At a 24 July meeting in Paris between the Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani, and an Israeli delegation, hosted by France and mediated by the US, the Israelis effectively pressured Damascus into making significant concessions. The result was the withdrawal of government forces from Suwayda, effectively ceding local government to a self-appointed council of Druze leaders. This move has catalysed a wider decentralisation push, with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) eagerly seizing the opportunity to advance their own autonomous agenda. On 8 August, a meeting in Hassake, attended by representatives of various ethnic and religious minorities, called for the creation of a decentralised state and the drafting of a new constitution that would guarantee religious, cultural, and ethnic pluralism. 

The devil you know
As the momentum for decentralisation grows, Turkey – already opposed to Kurdish autonomy – has become increasingly alarmed. Sources in Ankara have confirmed to Syria in Transition that, concerned by Damascus’ mishandling of the Suwayda situation and fearing further forced concessions, Ankara has pressured Sharaa into withdrawing from another round of French-hosted, US-mediated peace talks, this time with the Kurds. Turkey opposes both Israeli and French involvement in Syria and remains wary of the US due to its continued military support for the SDF. On 6 July the Pentagon announced a fresh $130 million allocation to fund the SDF’s counter-ISIS operations through 2026. 

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has helped to legitimise Sharaa's leadership, granting him “Arab cover” and burnishing his image on social media, but it has refrained from directly funding his government; and Saudi influence failed to shield him from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s wrath. Riyadh enjoys greater flexibility than Ankara in its alliances and, until December 2024, had been prepared to back Bashar Assad’s rehabilitation. Whoever holds power in Damascus needs Riyadh's political and economic backing, but not necessarily Ankara’s. Turkey in Syria finds itself without significant allies in its mission to restore a strong and credible centralised state.

The "zero problems" strategy that Sharaa adopted upon taking power is also unravelling. Israel is a hostile actor, the US maintains a contradictory stance, and the Europeans, once eager to engage, have gone quiet. The convergence of regional and international interests that Sharaa had hoped would sustain his regime hasn’t materialised, and that’s largely because of unresolved internal fractures that hostile actors were able to exploit. In the aftermath of Suwayda, which deepened these fractures, Ankara has issued a stern rebuke and is now trying to take a more assertive role in shaping Syrian policy. According to informed sources, Turkey’s message to Sharaa is clear: strengthen ties with Moscow. Only with Russia back in the fold can Damascus – and Ankara – balance Israeli, Saudi, and Western influence in Syria, while preserving the country’s territorial integrity and a strong central government.

So it was that on 31 July Syria’s foreign minister headed to Moscow. “The current period is full of various challenges and threats, but it is also an opportunity to build a united and strong Syria. And, of course, we are interested in having Russia by our side on this path,” he declared at a press conference, alongside Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. While Moscow’s presence in Syria had never truly ended – it maintains naval and air bases along the coast, and a base in the northeast – Russia had, until now, been lying low, biding its time.

Now, Turkey sees a possible return to the Astana formula, a framework in which Ankara and Moscow coordinated closely, creating on-the-ground realities that Israel and the West could not bypass. For Turkey, what is now sought from Moscow is clear: a willingness to limit Israeli ambitions; resolve problems with the Druze and the Alawites; supply the weak Syrian military with arms and recondition existing stockpiles; and back the removal of the UN Security Council’s terrorist designations on Sharaa and his interior minister, Anas Khattab. More crucially, Russia’s support will be pivotal if Turkey decides to resolve the Kurdish issue in the old fashioned way. This could involve a Syrian army offensive supported by Turkish airpower, in a repeat of the 2016, 2018, and 2019 operations, all of which had been coordinated with Moscow. According to sources familiar with the talks, Russia has made its own demands. It seeks the restoration of Assad-era officers to the Syrian army, particularly those with strong ties to Moscow; the re-hiring of Druze and Alawite security officers to manage security in Druze- and Alawite-majority areas; and a restructuring of Syria’s debts, estimated at around $50 billion; and agreements granting Russia full legal status for its military bases in Syria.  

Solution from above
President Sharaa, like his predecessor, finds himself caught between two inescapable realities – maintaining a unified central state or facing Syrian fragmentation – while dealing with the inherent tensions between regional alliances and international expectations. If Sharaa takes Turkey’s advice and deepens ties with Russia, it might secure military and strategic support for a coercive solution to the “alliance of minorities”; but it risks alienating key segments of his Sunni base, which sees Russian backing as too close an echo of Assad's repression.  

At the same time, aligning more closely with Russia could place Sharaa at odds with the West, which has shown little appetite for working with a Syria under Moscow’s direct influence. While calling for a unified Syria, the West insists on a political solution that involves a power-sharing arrangement, particularly with the Kurds and other minorities. From Sharaa’s perspective, this would establish rival centres of power that run counter to his goal of maintaining total control over the nation’s political and military apparatus. Indeed, it is a dilemma also faced by Assad, who sought to preserve his rule through military means but faced persistent international pressure to talk and share power.

There is growing international recognition that the Syrian conflict (that has not yet ended) cannot be resolved by Damascus' top-down approach. To break the deadlock, a broader international conference – similar to the “Friends of Syria” format from earlier in the conflict – could provide an appropriate forum. A conference that brought together key players, including the US, Turkey, Russia, Israel, the Arabs, and the Europeans, could be a critical step in forging a UNSCR 2254-inspired roadmap on what needs to happen in the next three years. The carrot would be reconstruction funds for use once a political agreement had been reached. The roadmap could specify clear benchmarks for the return of displaced persons, reconstruction, and economic revitalisation, to be attained by transparent processes – all of this contingent on the success of a genuine national dialogue.

Such a dialogue would need to include all relevant Syrian parties – Sharaa’s government, the wider Sunni community, Kurds, Alawites, the Druze, and other minorities. A national pact, negotiated and agreed upon by all domestic sides, could provide the foundation for a permanent constitution and a political system that balanced the need for central authority with a degree of devolution and representation required to accommodate the country’s diverse communities. In this scenario Sharaa’s legitimacy might be strengthened, if he was recognised as President by all those convened.

Critical decision
Sharaa was badly burned by the Suwayda debacle. He had attempted to “impose the aura of the State” on the Druze – in the process intimidating the Kurds – but instead his defence ministry was bombed and he ended up ceding sovereignty. The longer that the matter remains unsettled, the more likely it is that temporary arrangements will become permanent. 

Now, Sharaa faces a critical decision: to continue pursuing a coercive strategy to unify the country, potentially with Turkish and Russian military backing; or to embrace dialogue and a degree of decentralisation and political pluralism. If his past political instincts are any guide, he will likely remain on his current course. The allure of one-upmanship (muzayada) and brinkmanship (siyasat hafat alhawiya) aligns with the populist impulses of his administration. Even in defeat, Sharaa could deploy the "I did not back down" narrative to bolster his credibility with his supporters and offer a lifeline to continue being the Sunni hardman. There may, however, be another, more productive way.