How Aleppo fell
Iran’s defence of the city faltered when a most trusted brigade defected

If Hezbollah was long considered the crown jewel of Iran’s Axis of Resistance in the Middle East, then the Baqir Brigade held that distinction in Syria. Formed in 2012 in Aleppo province, the militia eventually comprised thousands of fighters and was the most prominent of the local Syrian formations within the Iranian and Hezbollah-backed Local Defence Forces (LDF) network in Aleppo. But in retrospect the group’s influence — and the depth of Iranian and Hezbollah control over pro-regime militias more broadly — was gravely misunderstood. When rebels launched their offensive on Aleppo in late November 2024, the Baqir Brigade had already secretly agreed a defection deal with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and helped assassinate a senior IRGC commander who headed the LDF in Aleppo.

Siding with Iran
Named after the fifth Shia Imam Muhammad al-Baqir, a purported ancestor of the Bekara tribe which was traditionally loyal to the Assad regime, the Baqir Brigade grew into a powerful local force. Initially based in Aleppo, it expanded into Deir Ezzor between 2015 and 2020 as regime-aligned forces consolidated control. Although composed largely of Sunni fighters, the group was often described as fostering conversions to Twelver Shia Islam and spreading Shia teachings through its recruitment network. In reality, much of this was propaganda designed to please Iranian backers. 

The Baqir Brigade’s political clout was visible in the ascent of Omar al-Hasan, a brother of brigade leader Hajj Khalid, who won two terms as an independent member of the Syrian People’s Assembly (parliament.) In the brigade’s public imagery, displays of allegiance to Iran and Hezbollah were prominent. In one Aleppo headquarters images of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei were placed alongside reverent depictions of the Prophet Muhammad’s family. Online, Baqir Brigade’s media activists and members would similarly post images suggesting affinity with Shi’ism, characterise the group as part of the ‘Islamic Resistance in Syria’, and emphasise the connection with Iran and Hezbollah. A notable example were images of the Baqir Brigade’s leader Hajj Khalid with the IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. In a 2022 interview with the IRGC’s Tasnim News on the occasion of the second anniversary of his death, Hajj Khalid recounted his first meeting with Soleimani in 2013 and praised him as “the main supporter of recruiting the Syrian tribes” to defend Syria.

Co-optation not conversion
Yet the suggestions that the group’s leadership and members had embraced Twelver Shia Islam were in fact little more than rhetoric and images. While the Iranians indeed successfully recruited auxiliary forces for the regime’s army, the naming of the Baqir Brigade simply reflected an attempt by the group’s leadership and the Iranians to court favour and trust with each other. For the Iranians, the name was typical of the way that Shia religious imagery and names were used for armed groups. For the brigade’s leadership, the name reflected longstanding reverence among many Bekara tribesmen for the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family) and Muhammad al-Baqir in particular. This in no way meant any formal adoption of Shia Islam. In a recent meeting, Omar al-Hasan told Syria in Transition that he himself was Sunni and that the members of the Baqir Brigade, including those of the Bekara tribe, were primarily Sunni. He noted that reverence for members of the Ahl al-Bayt was no different from revering the Prophet’s companions such as Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman (the first, second and third caliphs in Sunni Islam.) Al-Hasan also noted that the brigade included members of other sects and ethnicities. Similarly, an online media activist for the Baqir Brigade told Syria in Transition the group had Christian and Kurdish members.

This reflected a broader strategy by Iran: to mobilise local Sunni populations through pragmatic incentives rather than genuine ideological alignment. The Local Defence Forces (LDF) were conceived to defend fighters’ home areas, contrasting with the national deployment and harsh terms of service in the regular Syrian Arab Army (SAA.) Better pay and localised assignments made the LDF more attractive to many young men seeking to avoid SAA conscription. But the limits of Iranian ideological influence were clear. Despite efforts such as the “Aleppo Defenders Legion” cultural project that aimed to instil loyalty to the Axis of Resistance, deep affinity never took hold. 

A turning point came in 2020 when Assad began reneging on an agreement that LDF members wanted for service in the SAA could fulfill their duty within the LDF. Assad now demanded that LDF personnel wanted for SAA service should be transferred — a demand with which the Iranians and Hezbollah largely complied. This undercut the LDF’s role as a preferable alternative to regular military service. Concurrently, Syria’s economy was collapsing further, and loyalists could see that the regime offered no path out of the crisis.

A quiet defection
HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa understood the shifting mood. In 2023 HTS began secret negotiations with the Baqir Brigade leadership via tribal intermediaries, notably Abu Ahmad Zakur, a then trusted lieutenant and himself a member of the Bekara tribe. The two sides struck a deal: in exchange for immunity, the brigade would refrain from defending the regime, provide intelligence on the SAA, and allow HTS elite units to embed within its Aleppo bases. Sharaa also offered guarantees that Aleppo’s minority communities would be protected.

When the Aleppo offensive began on 27 November 2024, the embedded HTS ‘red bands’ elite units launched a surprise attack on the regime’s central operations room in the city, in which IRGC officer Kioumars Pourhashemi, newly appointed head of the LDF in Aleppo, was killed. Simultaneously, the Baqir Brigade’s fighters either stood down or helped disrupt regime communications, and attacked key positions in rear areas of Aleppo, contributing to the collapse of regime defences there. Bekara clan activists supportive of al-Hajj Khalid even claim that members of the group coordinated and participated with the insurgency in the capture of Hama and Damascus.

The Baqir Brigade today
At present, Hajj Khalid continues to be a notable Bekara figure in Aleppo who is accorded particular reverence by his followers in the Baqir Brigade who also turned against the regime. It is unclear, however, whether his followers constitute a militia waiting to be incorporated into the new Syrian army or an autonomous force within Aleppo province. As the recent fighting in Suwayda between Druze armed groups and government forces unfolded, Hajj Khalid issued a statement saying that he and the Bekara had declared a general mobilization and that “thousands of fighters” were ready to support “the Syrian Arab Army and the leader President Ahmad al-Sharaa” and were awaiting orders. Similar statement issued in the name of the “Baqir Brigade leadership in Syria,” denounced Israel’s strikes in support of the Druze and declared a readiness to “sacrifice our lives and blood for this homeland.” Omar al-Hasan and other supporters of Hajj Khalid have since circulated footage showing Bekara tribesmen heading in convoy to do battle in Suwayda. 

In the end, Iran’s project to build a ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ turned out to be a paper tiger. The Baqir Brigade, long thought to be ideologically aligned, battle-tested, and loyal, proved to be an entity primarily invested in tribal and familial interests. It had ample reason initially to side with the regime; but that ultimately resolved that Iran was not the power it claimed to be and that Assad was not a leader worth defending.