If you can make it there…
Sharaa seeks legitimacy in New York

Syrian interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa’s forthcoming address to the UN General Assembly is being cast by loyalists as the “birth certificate of the New Syria.” For a man whose authority is contested at home and whose interim mandate remains constitutionally shaky, his New York appearance, on 24 September, will be steeped in symbolism. He will try to present Syria as entering a “new chapter,” but his promise of renewal has lost much of the weight it carried earlier in the year. Western diplomats increasingly voice such concerns in private, though they have so far refrained from acting on them.

Also billed is a US-brokered Syrian–Israeli “security agreement,” expected to be inked at the sidelines. Sharaa will appear not only as a respectable head of state but as the architect of a regime willing to strike difficult deals. What is reportedly on the table would give Israel de facto security primacy in the south. It would consolidate a US–Israeli-backed administration in Suwayda, establish a direct hotline between Damascus and Tel Aviv, and include provisions pointing towards “land swaps” and eventual normalisation over the occupied Golan. 

Israel’s continued incursions into Quneitra and Daraa, meanwhile, leave little doubt that it is pressing ahead with its declared plan to wrest the south from Damascus. Plans for a permanent humanitarian corridor from Israel to Suwayda underscore that Israel is in for the long game. In return, Washington dangles familiar promises — vague gestures on the Kurdish question, economic incentives, and Gulf financial backing; but nothing has materialised so far.

The Price
Sharaa had hoped his visit would be accompanied by the lifting of his terrorist designation at the Security Council. But a draft resolution floated by the US that would delist him ran into headwinds: China raised concerns, while other members argued the text strayed into broader provisions on trade and development aid while bypassing the principles of UNSCR 2254, diplomats in New York say. As a result, Sharaa — listed as President in the UN’s Protocol Blue Book — will now address the General Assembly while still designated a terrorist by the UN’s own Security Council, a situation both politically and legally awkward.

For Sharaa, the UN spotlight is precious because it adds to the currency sustaining his rule: international recognition and the narrative that only he stands in the way of state collapse and sectarian chaos. It is a game played by many strongmen in the region, and one for which Sharaa is well-suited. However, to pin the uncertainty over Syria’s future solely on him would be misleading; the powerful states setting the rules bear equal responsibility.

In Paris and New York, Damascus is badly outmatched. Israel brings a seasoned negotiating machine, led by Ron Dermer and others deeply embedded in Washington. Until late 2024 Dermer was coordinating with US and Emirati officials on Syria policy. By contrast, Sharaa and his circle lack both institutional depth and bargaining power. “He and his group are playing survival politics while their counterparts are executing long-term strategy,” a retired US diplomat told Syria in Transition.

With the US complicit in Israel’s plans, the Europeans are keeping low. After Assad’s departure, delegations flocked to Damascus but largely for photo opportunities and fact-finding. Coordinated international diplomacy to support a credible transition ceased soon after Assad’s ouster. At the same time, think tanks and activists launched a one-note “drop the sanctions” campaign, exaggerating what relief could achieve while distracting from the underlying political issues that will determine Syria’s future. Today, Syria’s instability and stagnation stem less from sanctions than from the unresolved struggle between its ethnic and religious groups over how to divide power and resources (i.e. how to co-exist). Until that is settled, the economy will continue to struggle.

Sharaa is in an unenviable position vis-à-vis Israel. Even had he attempted national reconciliation, it’s unlikely this would have insulated Syria from Israeli aggression. He now finds himself turning to actors who are the most distrusted by his people; and Syrians’ scepticism is hardly irrational: successive US administrations, Democratic and Republican alike, have consistently privileged Israel’s security above all else. By leaning so heavily on Washington, Sharaa has placed Syria’s fate in the hands of a patron that has never pretended neutrality and has long treated Syria as a bargaining chip. 

Anything goes
Sharaa appears to believe that, despite the risks, the deal on the table in the US is his best shot: that he can survive the pressure, isolate the Kurds and Druze, strengthen his grip over the Sunni heartlands, and strike again when geopolitical circumstances shift. Concurrently, he is creating leverage by opening up to Russia and China. Defenders cast Sharaa as a bold leader who is breaking decades-old taboos and moving toward pragmatic détente. Yet with Syria in its weakened state and Israel’s agenda all too clear, his 24 September appearance in New York may be remembered for the signing of a one-sided deal that trades sovereignty for regime survival: precisely the sort of thing of which the opposition once accused the Assads.

In principle, most Syrians would go along with their president’s “zero problems” strategy and accept dialogue with Israel if it meant being left in peace. But peace is not at the forefront of Israel’s agenda, and the deal could well strike many as a humiliating surrender to an Israel that is occupying new Syrian territory while waging a live-streamed genocide against fellow Arabs in Gaza. There is also the risk that once one taboo is broken, others may follow: Syrians – and particularly Sunnis – could start striking their own self-interested deals with Israel and other powers, leaving state institutions fragmented and impotent and officials beholden to competing foreign patrons. In that scenario, any sense of Syrian patriotism could be permanently eroded.

It may already be too late for a credible and coherent national transition. Growing parts of the south are under Israeli occupation and Suwayda is drifting from Damascus. The SDF, still heavily armed and locked in stalled and irreconcilable talks with Damascus, are watching closely. Turkey has every incentive to retain its Syrian National Army (SNA) fiefdoms in the north, and may even seek to “flip” the SDF to create its own zone of influence in northern and eastern Syria. In the Alawite heartland, meanwhile, mounting security dilemmas go unanswered, making “integration” shallow, growing insurgency probable, and the emergence of an autonomous region — perhaps under Russian patronage — increasingly possible.

End of the road
UN envoy Geir Pedersen was right to remind the Security Council in August that legitimacy does not come from international podiums but must be earned inside Syria. Sharaa’s blend of efficiency and coercion, effective in Idlib, is faltering on the national stage. What Pedersen did not spell out is that the international community also failed Syria when it abandoned UNSCR 2254’s provision for an internationally overseen transition, negotiated and implemented by a governing body of Syrian equals. An inclusive presidential council headed by Sharaa might have spared much of the bloodshed and division since the Assad regime’s ouster on 8 December. The damage is done. The real question now is whether Syria can endure as one country at all.