New Age Salafism
Syria’s embrace of obedience over jihad

The rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to power in Syria has triggered a subtle yet significant ideological shift within the group and its supporters. While the gradual "Salafisation" of society continues through control of mosques, universities, and military academies, the government is moving away from traditional jihadi-Salafism and begun to align more closely with Madkhali Salafism. This school of thought, supported by Saudi Arabia and accepted by the West for its ability to counter jihadi-Salafism, has increasingly found support within HTS circles. This shift is being presented to hardliners within the group as a necessary response to public fatigue with prolonged war and the negative legacies of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS). The aim is to offer a more moderate and domestically focused Salafi approach.

Enter the Madkhalites
Madkhali Salafism, named after its key Saudi proponent, Rabi’ Hadi al-Madkhali (1933-2025), emerged as a counterforce to jihadist-Salafism in the early 1990s. Very much in the tradition of ‘quietist Islam’, its founders rejected political engagement and emphasised unconditional loyalty to the ruling regime, regardless of its repression. Unlike the more militant, global jihadist factions such as Al-Qaeda and IS, Madkhali thought advocates adherence to traditional Islamic law, obedience to authority, and a rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood and any religiously-inspired political organisation. This ideology gained traction among conservative elements within the Salafi movement, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and parts of North Africa, where it was promoted as a bulwark against the destabilising effects of political Islam.

In Yemen, when the Houthis took control of Sana’a in 2015 and advanced towards other provinces, the Madkhali movement took up arms after receiving backing from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Figures like Hani bin Braik, a prominent Madkhali preacher in Aden, rose to prominence. Under UAE pressure, he was appointed Minister of State in the first transitional government, in which role he oversaw the creation and financing of the Security Belt Forces - which allegedly targeted and assassinated imams who disagreed with him. In Egypt, the Madkhali movement supported President Sisi’s coup, with figures like Muhammad bin Saeed Raslan, known for his fierce attacks on the Muslim Brotherhood, playing a key role in the ideological arena.

In Libya, too, the Madkhali movement has played a significant role. Initially it sided with Gaddafi against the protests, considering them sedition. As the conflict evolved, however, the Madkhalis called for support of General Khalifa Haftar, with figures like Ashraf al-Mayar, a senior officer in Haftar’s army, praising "the war against the Kharijites." Al-Mayar, who became known as "Haftar's Mufti", issued a fatwa calling for the killing of Haftar's captured opponents, claiming they had "apostatised."

Five Tenets
For Syria’s new rulers, the ideas of Madkhali Salafism represent a strategic opportunity to reshape the ideological trajectory of the emerging conservative Sunni elite. No longer focused on exporting jihad or promoting internationalism, Syria’s leadership appears to be pivoting towards a more domestically oriented ideology that aims to consolidate power while aligning more closely with the religious values promoted by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This shift is subtle, occurring without grand announcements or public declarations; but it is evident through the actions and rhetoric of key religious figures. Clerics with significant followings within HTS and beyond, such as Syria-based Saudi preacher Abdullah al-Muheisni, Presidential Adviser on Religious Affairs Abdulrahim Atoun, and more mainstream figures like Minister of Religious Endowments Mohammad Abu al-Kheir Shukri, have increasingly espoused Madkhalite ideas on the pulpits and in their social media posts. This shift aligns conveniently with Syria’s rulers, as radical jihadism – due to its inherently violent and revolutionary nature – poses an obstacle to the state-building process they now seek to undertake.

Madkhali Salafism has five major tenets:

1. Unquestionable loyalty to the ruler. Madkhali Salafism’s most striking feature is its absolute obedience to the ruler, even when the ruler is viewed as sinful. Syria’s leadership has begun to adopt this principle, positioning President Sharaa as wali al-amr (“guardian of authority.”) His supporters promote the idea that any criticism of the government is not only disloyal but blasphemous. This shift is part of a broader attempt to centralise power under Sharaa, with some even suggesting a hereditary monarchy in the future – a concept that resonates with the ultra-conservative elements within the government.

2. Rejection of political pluralism. The Syrian government has tacitly embraced the Madkhali Salafi stance that politics and democracy are inherently corrupting. The government has actively discouraged political parties and opposed the notion of political freedom, framing the revolution as a rebellion against the “infidel” Assad regime rather than a genuine struggle for freedom and democracy. This ideological contradiction – opposing political freedoms while claiming to uphold them – speaks to the government’s struggle to balance appeasing the West while maintaining internal legitimacy. 

3. Return to traditional jurisprudence. Another key development is the abandonment of the more flexible, reformist interpretation of Islamic law championed by the late Syrian Salafist cleric Nasir al-Din al-Albani. Instead, Syria is returning to more rigid, sectarian forms of jurisprudence, aligning itself with the centuries-old Ash'ari, Maturidi, and Ahl al-Hadith schools. This move has deep implications for Syria’s juridical and religious landscape, potentially eroding the intellectual diversity that has characterised the country’s religious scholarship and making ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) nearly impossible. 

4. Rejection of jihad and advocating peace with Israel. One of the more notable changes in HTS’s ideological pivot is its abandonment of jihad as a guiding principle. HTS’s previous alignment with jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS was largely rooted in a shared goal of resisting West-backed rulers, but Madkhali Salafism rejects such campaigns. Syria’s leaders have begun to promote a message of reconciliation, even with Israel, as part of their efforts to position themselves as pragmatic actors. According to Madkhalites, the domain of politics belongs solely to the legitimate ruler and whatever he decides in terms of treaties and alliances must be in the state’s best interest. 

5. Nationalism over internationalism. Unlike the earlier Salafi-jihadist vision, which saw Syria as part of a larger pan-Islamic movement, Madkhali Salafism is focused on national interests. Syria’s leadership appears intent on fostering a sense of Syrian nationalism, sidelining the once-prominent rhetoric of Islamic universalism that had been championed by a previous generation of Salafist clerics such as Saudi Arabia’s Ibn Baz and Ibn Uthaymeen. This shift is consistent with broader regional trends. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has embraced a more nationalistic vision, distancing itself from the pan-Islamic ideals that once defined its foreign policy.

Break with the past
The government’s ideological shift may resonate with certain conservative factions within Syrian society, but it faces significant challenges. Resistance from HTS hardliners, who still adhere to jihadi-Salafism, could be substantial. Syria’s Sunni majority, which traditionally follows Sufi or Ash'ari doctrines, is unlikely spontaneously to embrace Salafism. The country’s deeply rooted religious diversity, coupled with the entrenched influence of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, are further reasons why the government’s efforts are likely to encounter opposition. While the Brotherhood is currently weakened, it could still serve as a counterbalance to the government’s ideological overhaul, particularly in mosques and communities that remain beyond the state’s control. 

Key regional powers take contrasting positions. While Saudi Arabia is supportive, the UAE remains sceptical, unconvinced that the Syrian government has fully severed ties with its former jihadist allies. Turkey is also doubtful, but for a different reason: Salafism strongly opposes Sufism, the dominant form of Islam practised in Turkey. Israel, meanwhile, rejects all Islamist movements but sees HTS as a particular threat due in part to its ability to adapt and transform ideologically. What is clear, however, is that a complex mix of experimental ideas is permeating the public sphere. While the outcome remains uncertain, the process itself is fascinating, and underlines the adaptive pragmatism of the group now leading Syria.