Reconstruction-lite
UN introduces Early Recovery Trust Fund

After a long wait, the UN has finally unveiled to donors and partners its Early Recovery Strategy 2024-28 document, calling for the creation of an Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF). This new fund will be based in Damascus and will operate under the direct leadership of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC.) Key features, it is claimed, will be greater “operational flexibility” and “longer timeframes.”

ERTF’s creation started with one man: Martin Griffiths. As head of OCHA, he seized on last year’s earthquake to reach out to Bashar Assad and convince him of the need for a genuine give-and-take process. According to informed sources, early recovery was much discussed. Griffiths is said to have suggested that a new fund would attract Gulf money as it would have fewer red lines than the Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF) and the Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF) that support activities in line with the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP.) 

Efforts to empower the Damascus-based RCs over control of early recovery assistance actually date back to 2016/17. They‘ve been consistently pushed by the UN country team (CT) ever since. In 2019, the UN system underwent reforms that separated the positions of RC and UNDP country representative. This stripped the RCs of significant leverage as they no longer held sway over UNDP funds. Adam Abdelmoula, however, who was appointed RC in May 2023, is a strong advocate of introducing a more developmental model to early recovery, which chimes with the ERTF’s formula.  

Former UNDP colleague Abdallah al-Dardari, meanwhile, was appointed in March 2023 as UNDP’s Assistant Secretary-General, Assistant Administrator, and Director of the Regional Bureau for Arab States. Sources say that Dardari plans to expand the early recovery budget to $500 million - a 500 per cent increase on funding currently provided in the 2023 HRP budget. This would turn early recovery into the defining feature of the humanitarian response in Syria. 

Structural flaws
The UN’s plans to turbo charge early recovery in Syria are ambitious but flawed. They are not as humanitarian as the marketing claims. The UN’s Syria country team (CT) continuously pushes the boundaries of what falls under early recovery assistance. Insisting that the ERTF is purely humanitarian allows the CT – at least in the short and medium terms – to resist subjecting UN funds to political negotiations and conditionalities. More importantly, it allows the CT to bypass US and European sanctions while reassuring sceptical donors who say that development and reconstruction money is inherently political. The ERTF introduces electricity as the “cross-cutting enabler of early recovery across all core priority areas,” making it an effective vehicle for activities that go beyond even generous definitions of what constitutes “humanitarian assistance.” The Early Recovery Strategy 2024-28 includes not only rehabilitation but the “expansion” of water supply facilities, suggesting potential major infrastructure projects worth hundreds of millions of euros. 

Structurally, the CT attempts to centralise power in the Damascus-based Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC.) The ERTF will be spearheaded by UN agencies overseen by the RC who are meant to lead a “Whole of Syria Approach” from offices in Damascus. This risks sidelining the nuanced needs and perspectives of areas outside the Assad regime’s control – a not inconsiderable 40 per cent of Syria. Also missing in the strategy paper is reference to UNSCR 2254 or consideration of the crucial political dimensions of early recovery assistance, thorough political context and risk analysis are thus absent. 

A further problem are plans to put the ERTF’s Risk Management Unit under the authority of the RC, undermining the independence it needs to function correctly. The ERTF’s steering committee, co-chaired by the RC and the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), comprises UN agencies, INGOs, and donors. Described as consensus-based, the ultimate decision-making authority lies with the RC and HC, allowing them to override donor concerns. This should worry donor capitals who expect a meaningful say in how their tax-payer’s euros and dollars are spent.

Blurred lines 
Early recovery is a useful framework for projects that bring much-needed medium- and -long-term relief to Syrian civilians. To check the ‘Do No Harm’ box, however, early recovery must be implemented independently and equitably in all parts of Syria. With that in mind, the UN’s justification for creating a cost-intensive new fund is not convincing. A five-year funding period and more integrated area-based activities — the ERTF’s unique selling points — could feature within the existing HRP framework, under which the definition and limits of early recovery assistance in Syria are more clearly spelt out. Setting up parallel structures suggests that Gulf countries might be the target donors for the ERTF. In its current form, the ERTF risks contributing to a two-tier humanitarian response: a premium version for Assad regime areas and a basic one for the rest of Syria.

In seeking to avoid clear demarcation on where early recovery programming ends and reconstruction begins, the UN risks damaging core humanitarian principles. The formula of “we only rehabilitate, we do not rebuild” is not practical in the Syrian context given the scale of destruction. 

Defining a limit to coordination and cooperation with Syrian authorities is sensible; but the ERTF is not at all clear on this issue. The Early Recovery Strategy 2024-28 briefly mentions partnership and cooperation with municipalities; but the reality today is that project applications submitted at the municipality level are discussed by the High Relief Committee, which is headed by the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (both positions are targeted by EU sanctions) and includes Asma Assad’s Syria Trust for Development (STD) and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). Additional direct engagement with ministries is not obligatory to obtain approvals but is certainly “helpful”, practitioners say. The plans for early recovery activities outlined by the UN country team require a degree of centralised governance that local communities and civil society organisations (CSOs) alone cannot provide, even if the regime allowed it. In this light, it is unsurprising that the Early Recovery Strategy 2024-28 pays lip service to local empowerment; but the ERTF does not provide any modalities to fund local partners directly, instead prioritising funding through UN-partnered INGOs.

The comprehensive recovery that the ERTF aims to achieve entails coordination and cooperation with Syrian authorities in a way that, intended or not, legitimises them. It’s not just about inherent political recognition, but the ability to provide services: a major source of power in the Syrian conflict. The ERTF project requires a clear definition of scope, distinct from reconstruction; and must be subject to political understandings, arising from negotiation and consensus, that early recovery funds will be distributed equitably in all areas of Syria. 

Over the last decade the Assad regime has been able to exert tremendous pressure on the UN country team. Any new humanitarian architecture must shield the UN from further bullying and manipulation. Donors who overlook whether the UN’s case for creating a new fund is credible, should at least insist on improving its structure in terms of truly independent assessments, safeguards, and checks and balances regarding decision-making, vetting, and monitoring. The goal should be to avoid the kind of aid diversion and politicisation that has damaged the credibility of the UN’s humanitarian aid response and discouraged donors. In principle, the ERTF has potential; but its design risks a repetition of too many mistakes – and on a much larger and more damaging scale.