Terrorism reawakened
Islamic State is a growing (and useful) threat

In the aftermath of the Syrian regime’s collapse, one force has quietly regrouped across the fractured country: Islamic State (IS). It initially capitalised on the abandonment of government armouries and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) depots to seize vast amounts of weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. Its fighters fanned out from the desert hinterlands into poor districts in Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, and Deir Ezzor. Yet unlike its brutal blitzkriegs of old, this return was marked by discretion. There were no early assaults or provocations. Instead, IS sought sanctuary and quiet entrenchmant. 

Geography of control
Although IS has reduced its visible footprint in Syria’s vast Badia desert – largely in response to US airstrikes – it has quietly consolidated its grip on three critical mountainous areas: the Bishri Mountains south of Raqqa, the Shaer Mountains east of Hama and Homs, and the rugged al-Amour range stretching to the outskirts of Deir Ezzor. These areas provide natural fortification and house elaborate networks of underground bunkers and hideouts.

These fortified zones function as fallback positions, storage depots, and operational hubs. Reports suggest key IS commanders are now based in Bishri, under orders to dig in and insulate their positions from civilian interference. The IS gameplan is to preserve strength in terrain conducive to guerrilla warfare, while gradually extending reach into the more complex, populous urban sprawl.

Fighters are being quietly moved from SDF-controlled areas to government-held areas, particularly around the city of Al-Mayadin. Their numbers – estimated between 2,000 and 3,000 – are modest, but their equipment stockpiles are impressive. So vast are their ammunition reserves that they now destroy newly acquired caches rather than bother to transport them.

Crucially, IS has adapted its urban strategy. Instead of attempting to seize and hold territory – a method that previously triggered international backlash – it now embeds sleeper cells within densely populated, mixed communities in cities like Aleppo and Damascus, allowing its fighters to blend in and remain undetected. Direct confrontation with the new Syrian state is being deliberately deferred to give IS time to rebuild its strength, expand its ranks, and – significantly – pursue infiltration of HTS, potentially even positioning itself to eliminate senior HTS figures.

American caution
The United States has maintained a largely conservative posture. Airstrikes continue, albeit sporadically and with minimal lasting effect. Washington has focused more on rival Al-Qaeda-linked jihadist group Hurras al-Din, whose senior operatives were recently targeted in twin strikes on 10 June. Notably, US intelligence has shown a pattern: targeting individuals in Hurras al-Din, while focusing on infrastructure in IS-held terrain.

This distinction – deliberate or not – has fuelled speculation that the US may be tolerating a degree of IS resurgence to strengthen the SDF’s value in negotiations between Damascus and the Kurds. Although there is no evidence of such intent, the limited intensity of US operations against IS, despite detailed intelligence, has raised eyebrows. American officials have also reportedly shared information with Syrian security services, including in a joint operation that foiled a planned IS attack on the Sayyida Zaynab shrine in January. Meanwhile, US-backed groups like the Free Syria Army garrisoned in Al-Tanf are said to be supplying government forces with satellite imagery and field intelligence on IS movements in the Badia.

Buying time
IS’s current strategy is one of infiltration, opportunism, and perseverance. The group’s media arms have resumed operations, releasing four major statements since Assad’s fall – each targeting HTS and President Sharaa personally. The intent is not yet to re-establish the caliphate, but to chip away at HTS’ authority and wait for the right moment to strike. Recruitment has intensified, targeting youths from areas formerly under Assad regime control, where the IS brand remains less tarnished. 

The capacity for a terror campaign already exists. IS has men, munitions, intelligence, and safe houses. What it lacks – for now – is the political space to act without drawing an overwhelming international response. Should attention turn away from Syria, an opportunity may present itself.

The Syrian government appears ambivalent towards the IS threat. On one hand, it seeks to capitalise politically on the menace, amplifying the group’s perceived strength through social media disinformation and alarmist messaging. On the other, it is deliberately avoiding confrontation in open terrain like Palmyra, aware of its own limited troop numbers and IS’s capacity for asymmetric warfare.  

Interior Minister Anas Khattab is believed to be leading indirect negotiations with some IS commanders. These talks aim to delay open conflict so as to allow Syria’s security forces to develop capacity. Offers of co-option are said to have been made in return for cutting ties with IS. Nevertheless, HTS-led General Security is cracking down on IS cells, particularly in major cities. A string of arrests and firefights in February and May – in Daraa, al-Sanamayn, and Aleppo – suggests that Khattab will not tolerate flagrant IS infiltration of urban centres. 

Familiar danger
Both Washington and the HTS-led government in Damascus have reason to exaggerate the immediate threat posed by Islamic State. Yet this inflation carries its own risks. Magnifying the threat while failing to eliminate it risks creating the very conditions in which IS might again resurface as a player on the national level.  

The deeper truth is that the enduring appeal of IS lies not in its firepower, but in the fractious nature of Sunni society. A real bulwark against jihadist revival is the moral and political consolidation of the Sunni majority. That means the government bridging the wide gap between the urban and rural middle classes, and between liberal, conservative, and ultra-religious wings of Sunni society. Without a moderate programme of national renewal that gives voice and agency to this broad Sunni base (i.e. politics), IS will continue to draw tacit sympathy, if not recruits. As long as exclusion and mistrust prevail, the group will find places to hide, people to shield them, and a narrative – however warped – that recasts them as modern-day Robin Hoods.