The last banner of Zaynab

For decades, a man-sized ‘Oh Zaynab’ banner fluttered above the golden dome of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine southeast of Damascus. In April it was quietly removed, perhaps the clearest sign yet of Shia deference to Syria’s new Sunni rulers. The shrine’s fate mirrors that of the country’s Shia community since the fall of Assad: tolerated, yet expected to acknowledge the supremacy of the new Sunni-led order.

During the civil war in Syria, the shrine was a key symbolic element in the justification for the intervention of Iran, Hezbollah and other Shia allies of the Assad regime. Dedicated to Imam Ali's daughter Zaynab, who was said to have been brought to Damascus as a captive from Karbala by the Umayyads in the 7th Century, it signified Shia steadfastness and sacrifice. Hezbollah often referred to its fallen fighters as 'knights' or 'martyrs' of Zaynab, while the slogan 'Zaynab will not be taken captive twice’ - meaning that the shrine must not fall to Sunni rebels – became a battlefield refrain.

The shrine also brought a crucial source of local income. Shia pilgrims from across the region sustained a modest tourism economy, filling nearby hotels and gift shops. Package tours were offered from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran. The increased presence of foreign Shia pilgrims and tourists fuelled speculation that Tehran and the regime were engineering a demographic change by settling foreign Shia in and around the capital city.

Yet the notion of 'shrine defence' collapsed as swiftly as the regime itself. Assad’s fall late last year rendered the shrine’s future uncertain as the new administration of President Ahmad al-Sharaa has indulged in anti-Shia rhetoric. Fears of the shrine’s destruction, however, proved over-blown – an outcome that some Shia would attribute to divine protection. As one Iraqi based in Syria who had fought on the side of the Assad regime put it: "Sayyida Zaynab – peace be upon her – is protected by the Lord of the Worlds." 

Today, the shrine's status in many ways reflects the constrained position of Syria’s Shia minority. It remains open and is assigned protection by government security personnel (none of whom, however, are themselves Shia), with the government also plausibly claiming to have foiled Islamic State attacks as proof of its commitment to protection of minority religious sites. A slogan painted on a wall outside reads: 'Syria is a homeland for all.' Sharaa himself has also held meetings with representatives of the Shia sect in Syria.

A closer look at the shrine itself and its surroundings sheds light on the subservient position of Shias under the new system. Apart from the cemetery that contains tombs of some 'martyrs' decorated with Hezbollah's emblems, all traces of Iranian and Hezbollah influence – once prominent in the area – have been effaced. The foreign pilgrims are largely gone, and even during Shia religious festivals there are no longer large crowds pushing and shoving to touch Zaynab's reputed tomb. Donations have dwindled, gift shops are deserted, and shrine workers complain of unpaid or insufficient salaries. Pilgrim hotels remain closed – although it’s rumoured locally that some are being used to house displaced Bedouins from Suwayda.

A worker at the 'Holy Zaynab Shrine Administration' — long run by the Mortadas, a prominent local Shia family — explained to Syria in Transition that the ‘Oh Zaynab’ banner was removed after someone had filmed it on their phone and posted the footage on social media, asking how this banner could be allowed to remain when it was the banner under which Shia militias fought Sunni rebels. The controversy quickly led to a meeting between the shrine's administration, local Shia clerics and local security officials, and it was agreed that the banner should be removed to avoid fitna — sectarian strife.

The same logic underlies a recently-imposed ban on bringing mobile phones into the shrine. Officials feared that videos of the recitation of Shia prayers — with lines invoking curses on the Umayyads — could provoke Sunni outrage, given a political climate where the Umayyad legacy is being recast as a symbol of Sunni revival. 

Not all Shia are happy with the shrine’s current administration. Some worshippers and local residents allege mismanagement and corruption. In late January the shrine’s oversight committee — chaired by members of the Mortada family — wrote to President Sharaa complaining that a “group of people with bad reputations and criminal pasts” had gained followers by promises of jobs at the shrine, and then launched an altercation with the shrine’s administration in an attempt to “stir internal fitna in the sect”. The letter, flattering in tone, praised the intervention of government security personnel who had restored order. “There is good cooperation on the part of the Public Security to prevent any transgression against the shrine,” Jaafar Qasim, director at the shrine’s administration, told Syria in Transition.

Earlier in January, the new government’s Ministry of Religious Endowments had issued a decision suggesting the shrine would be brought under direct state control, but it was swiftly retracted — likely as a concession to the Mortada family in exchange for its continued support for the Sharaa government. The Mortadas, for their part, receive backing from controversial Shia cleric Sheikh Adham al-Khatib, a Sunni convert who serves as principal liaison between Syria’s Shia community and Damascus. A shrewd operator, Al-Khatib nonetheless is considered by some as lacking the seniority and religious gravitas to lead the country’s Shia community.

The sharp drop in foreign visitors has brought economic hardship; but the sense of grievance and bitterness is not directed only at the new rulers in Damascus. The same worker who explained the removal of the banner also complained that the Syrian Shia had been abandoned by their co-religionists abroad. Many of Syria’s several hundred thousand Shia (reliable numbers do not exist) – and particularly those from Homs province – managed to flee to Lebanon, but Iran, Hezbollah and other foreign Shia allies of the former regime made no effort to organise large-scale evacuation or resettlement. Many of those who had worked alongside the regime, including Iranian and Hezbollah forces, were effectively left to fend for themselves.

Deprived of foreign backing and scattered across isolated communities, Syria’s Shia now find themselves forced to adapt. Unlike the Druze and Alawites, they lack a contiguous territorial base or political discourse of autonomy. Talk about a “Shia region” or “Shia state” is entirely absent. Most have opted to keep their heads down. Some outwardly denounce the former regime and show token support for the new government by participating in small rallies in favour of "the reimposition of state authority." Others who were never aligned with Iran now readily criticise it. Those still loyal to Iran’s Supreme Leader as their religious authority prefer silence and quietly look for ways to emigrate. Fear is still widespread. Shia individuals have been assassinated across Syria since the regime’s fall, and while not all incidents are necessarily driven by sectarian motives, many are perceived that way. With Iran ostracised in post-Assad Syria, the Shia have lost their sole external protector and lobbyist, and now fear retribution for past crimes committed in the name of their faith. Laying low and surviving is the order of the day.