The secret behind the SDF’s endurance

Despite the political and media fanfare that accompanied the 10 March agreement between the Damascus government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), its significance has been widely overstated. The debate since then has focused on whether the deal will be implemented before the end of the year, amid a flurry of official and unofficial Syrian statements. These were accompanied by Turkish declarations pressing for the dismantling of the SDF as a military and security structure. Yet the real issue does not lie in the form of the agreement, nor in its technical provisions.

Instead, the heart of the matter is deeper and more decisive: the level of international and regional trust in the Damascus government as a reliable security partner.

Whatever the shape of the agreement, and however far-reaching the concessions made by both sides, it will not lead to the dissolution of the SDF or the erasure of its military and security presence from the Syrian map. The reason is simple: the international environment is still not prepared to grant the Damascus government the status of the country’s sole security partner, particularly on sensitive files such as counterterrorism and the management of stability in the postwar phase.

Although US president Donald Trump has confirmed cooperation with the Syrian government in the fight against Islamic State – even to the point of Syria’s joining the international coalition against it – this partnership has yet to reach the level of full trust. Building confidence in security matters is a cumulative process that requires years of stable, institutional performance that can be verified, along with continuous testing of the conduct of the army and security forces, its personnel and the discourse of the military establishment itself.

This remains beyond the threshold of American confidence. The clearest illustration is the recent Palmyra incident, in which two US soldiers and their translator were killed when they were targeted by a member of the Syrian government’s own security forces – an act acknowledged by the Syrian interior ministry itself. Add to this the question of the identity of the nascent Syrian army, its rhetoric, and the pro-Palestine chants heard during the military parade in Damascus marking the first anniversary of liberation. All of this feeds suspicion about the government’s ability to impose comprehensive security control. 

Moreover, the fledgling Syrian army lacks the military capabilities required to make a meaningful contribution to the fight against Islamic State, despite recent security successes by government forces in arresting a number of the group’s leaders and members. Any reliance on it will therefore be limited to its ability to supply intelligence to the US-led coalition, and to assurances that none of its fighters will evolve into a future security threat or that Islamic State will not continue to infiltrate its ranks.

By contrast, the SDF has a long and proven track record in combating Islamic State and enjoys deep-rooted trust in Washington. This explains the continuation of US support, including the recent allocation of more than $130m. That support is a clear political signal that the United States has no intention of abandoning the SDF as a security partner in the foreseeable future, regardless of the nature of any agreement with Damascus.

This logic is not confined to the US relationship with the SDF. Washington continues to rely on local proxies in the Syrian desert under the banner of the “Free Syria Army”, nominally affiliated with Syria’s ministry of defence and based at al-Tanf. Since the fall of the previous regime, this force has also been running al-Dumayr airbase at the north-eastern gateway to Damascus. 

Nor is this approach unique to the United States. Turkey, despite its relatively strong alliance with the Damascus government, is widely believed to retain significant influence over the 62nd and 76th divisions of the Ministry of Defence, led by former Turkish allies from the Syrian National Army, Mohammad al-Jassem (aka Abu Amsha) and Saif Abu Bakr. Israel, too, follows a similar model in the south, relying on local Druze formations as an indirect security buffer.

Any agreement with the SDF will not depart from a model that denies the state a full restoration of its security and administrative functions across the national territory. What is emerging instead is a hybrid arrangement: a weak centre engaged diplomatically and politically, alongside peripheral actors whose security roles are aligned with the interests of international and regional powers.

For Damascus to escape this fate, it should adopt a model of governance grounded in real power-sharing with political figures and social elites who are broader, more representative, and more credible. And while earning international confidence on security matters will in any case be a long process, building trust in a leadership whose figures were only recently removed from terrorism lists will take even longer. The cost of that delay will be paid in the government’s diminished capacity to meet its obligations, both at home and abroad.