How the government is looking to absorb popular anger

Mohammed Taha al-Ahmad’s recent article in Al-Thawra newspaper, “Fortifying the Syrian State Against the Storm of Regional Upheaval”, was hardly surprising. As director of Arab affairs at the Syrian foreign ministry, his intervention came at a moment of rising public unease – particularly among the Sunni Arab majority that granted the new state nearly a full year of almost unconditional support.

At the beginning of the second year, however, that goodwill has collided with severe economic crises, an unprecedented surge in prices and a widening gap of trust between the authorities and society. At the same time, visible displays of luxury and the concentration of decision-making in the hands of the president and a narrow circle around him appear far removed from the aspirations of Syrians emerging from six decades of authoritarian rule.

From the earliest days of the transitional period, the president opted for a highly centralised presidential model, exceeding in scope the powers granted to presidents under stable presidential constitutions such as those of Turkey and the United States.

Through the constitutional declaration he effectively seized control of the executive branch, and subsequently assumed legislative decision-making powers in violation of that same declaration. Meanwhile, the constitutional court responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of laws and legislation has yet to see the light of day. Article 47 of the constitutional declaration stipulates that the president appoints its members and regulates its work through a law enacted by parliament. Yet parliament itself remains paralysed because the president has not appointed the seventy members required under Article 24 of the declaration.

At the same time, there has been increasing discussion of challenges to judicial independence, including alleged violations of the law governing judicial authority in the appointment of certain judges to the Supreme Judicial Council despite their failure to meet the qualifications required for the post.

This centralisation has been accompanied by a restructuring of the state through the creation of independent bodies reporting directly to the president. These have been granted wide powers that sometimes exceed – and occasionally conflict with – those of existing ministries. Some ministries remain indirectly controlled through deputy ministers, while others – such as the interior, defence and foreign ministries – are entirely under presidential control.

Within educational circles, there is growing talk of diminishing attention and support for the ministries of education and higher education. At the same time, the powers of the presidency’s general secretariat have expanded to the point that it effectively rivals the position of the prime minister, hollowing out the government’s real role.

Grand promises were made about contracts and investments, with state media speaking of huge figures and strategic projects. Yet as the months passed, many of these agreements were delayed or proved insubstantial. Citizens increasingly sensed that rhetoric was outrunning reality.

Against this backdrop, repeated leaks have surfaced about sweeping changes that could affect ministers, governors and even the president’s two brothers. This has given Dr al-Ahmad’s article a political significance that goes beyond theoretical debate. He called for adopting a balanced republican system that distributes authority between a president responsible for sovereign and strategic roles, and a prime minister tasked with the day-to-day management of the executive branch.

Yet this proposal ignores the reality of a paralysed parliament, a judiciary entirely subordinate to the executive branch, and the narrow, loyalty-based appointments that have characterised the first year of rule. It also overlooks the fact that any genuine institutional balance must begin with restoring parliamentary life, guaranteeing judicial independence, and redefining the relationship between the presidency and the government on clear and transparent foundations.

The trajectory of the past year suggests an effort to construct a position for the president that is “above day-to-day politics”. Citizens, however, have begun linking failures to the presidential system itself. Criticism is no longer confined to quiet whispers. The search for a semi-presidential arrangement may therefore represent an attempt to absorb public anger by shifting part of the responsibility onto a government that can be criticised and replaced, while leaving the president as the ultimate authority.

Amending the constitutional declaration will require a complex legal process and the approval of two-thirds of parliament, a step that would inevitably open a broad debate about the articles that concentrate power in the president’s hands. It is difficult to imagine such a debate proceeding without wider demands to rebalance authority among institutions and guarantee genuine independence for them.

In the end, the debate over the most suitable system for Syria is both legitimate and necessary. The solution does not lie in leaping between systems, but in reforming the substance of political practice: broadening appointments based on merit, granting ministers real authority, activating parliament so that it can perform its legislative and oversight role, and genuinely liberating the judiciary.

Only then can any system – presidential or semi-presidential – serve as a viable framework for a state of institutions.