Peace in Hasakah has yet to yield dividends

When Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), announced the force’s dissolution from Damascus, the chapter of non-state armed actors in Hasakah province was closed. Abdi has also secured a post as a presidential adviser, while Ilham Ahmed has taking a seat in parliament.

The announcement followed the Asayish, the Kurdish-led internal security forces, agreeing to merge into the General Security forces. The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) have since joined the Interior Ministry. Several contingents from brigades formed out of the SDF have also travelled to al-Nabk for training before returning to serve in their home areas.

The challenge now for Hasakah is the growing gap between the pace of military and security integration and the sluggish progress on civilian administrative integration. There is no clear framework for how the two bureaucracies will work together. Nor is there a political agreement offering a comprehensive settlement of the Kurdish question as a whole. Discussion of a shared national narrative, identity and social contract is almost entirely absent. 

This has led some Kurds to question the political acumen of the Democratic Union Party’s (PYD), with some suggestions that its influence is waning. Others point to its near-monopoly on negotiations and posts, and its ability to influence the governance of the province like no other Kurdish actor. Those absent when decisions are taken are unlikely to wield much power when those decisions are put into practice. 

The distribution of administrative posts in Hasakah reveals the true balance of power. Positions have been divided between supporters of Damascus, drawn exclusively from the Arab community, and supporters or members of the Autonomous Administration, the SDF and the Democratic Union Party, drawn exclusively from the Kurdish community. One exception is the appointment of a woman from the Syriac Union Party to Hasakah’s provincial council. That party is one of two organisations representing the Assyrian-Syriac Christian community, alongside the Assyrian Democratic Organisation, which sits outside the Autonomous Administration, which obtained a single parliamentary seat on the president’s list. 

Conspicuously absent are Arabs nominated by the Autonomous Administration. The Kurdish National Council is also entirely absent from the civilian administration of Hasakah. That exclusion undermines the Council’s longstanding presence in the province. Participation in institutions and public office is, after all, one of the principal means by which any political project acquires practical force. The PYD is not done yet.

Alongside the struggle over representation and posts comes the task of getting institutions working again – and persuading people to trust them. During its own years of ruling the northeast, the Autonomous Administration failed to establish itself as a reliable provider of services, or to offer a model of government worth emulating. With its ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, Hasakah’s ability to achieve stability will be an important indicator of the success of the transition. Integration here could encourage other regions, perhaps even provide a model they could follow. But that promise will remain hollow unless people see a tangible improvement in their daily lives.

So far, living conditions have deteriorated. Energy and fuel prices have become a nightmare that intrudes upon every aspect of daily life. Protests in Qamishli have continued for almost two months, yet appear to have achieved nothing. Conditions have instead worsened: fuel prices have risen repeatedly, electricity has been cut, and household subscriptions to private generator supplies have become more expensive.

The message from the government might as well be: protest to your heart’s content; we shall do as we please.

With no convincing explanation, or adequate official justification, for these punishing increases, people increasingly see the government and the former Autonomous Administration as intent on loading blame onto one another while dividing up the spoils between them. 

Through its spokespeople and sympathetic TV pundits, the Autonomous Administration seeks to portray rising prices as a consequence of integration, leaving Damascus solely responsible for the mess now that it has sole control of energy resources. Damascus, meanwhile, seeks to make the opposite case: that the Autonomous Administration’s continued influence is directly responsible for the worsening problems.

Neither argument pays a household’s electricity bill. Nor does this exchange of accusations give citizens much reason to trust the institutions now claiming to serve them.