Why Arab tribes haven’t defected from the SDF

During the recent clashes between the Asayish and government forces in Aleppo city, some observers claimed that Arab tribal components of the SDF had defected to the government side, presenting this as a decisive factor behind the SDF’s defeat there. A closer look suggests these claims are somewhat simplistic.

The armed tribesmen who appeared in the Kurdish-majority Ashrafiya district were local Baggara tribesmen of various backgrounds. Some were civilians, others members of the Iranian-backed Baqir Brigade network that had defected during the collapse of the Assad regime, and others still had been working with the SDF in Aleppo since the days prior to the regime's fall. Their alignment and coordination with the new HTS-led government began from its inception. They had simply been waiting for the government to make a decisive military move against the SDF in Aleppo.

Other cases that were interpreted as defections involved Kurdish SDF members originally from Afrin, who had been displaced to Aleppo after Turkey’s 2018 invasion. These fighters chose to abandon the SDF, surrender their weapons, and seek a return to their homes in Afrin — a personal decision rooted in displacement fatigue rather than an organised Arab tribal break with the SDF.

Far from signalling a broader internal collapse, these episodes underline a recurring pattern: despite repeated predictions to the contrary, the SDF has remained broadly cohesive in the core territories it controls. Understanding why requires a clearer picture of what the SDF actually is — and what it is not.

Despite its own portrayal as a unified, professional army, the SDF is better understood as a coalition operating under a single general command. It consists of several layers: foundational factions with their own chains of command; provincial and local military councils; various “special forces” units; and a self-defence conscription force based out of Hasakah city. The SDF’s ‘internal system’, published in 2020, explicitly names seven factions as its “foundational components”.

The most important of these is the YPG, the armed wing of the PYD and the original US-backed force against Islamic State. Other factions such as the Northern Democratic Forces in Raqqa or Jabhat al-Akrad function largely as satellites of the YPG and PYD. They issue statements, participate in rallies, and help sustain the movement’s ideological narrative, but do not operate as autonomous power centres.

The military councils, by contrast, are a later and distinct development. Although they often appear alongside YPG symbols in SDF media, they are formally separate structures. A representative of the Tabqa Military Council told me that while councils coordinate with SDF factions on, for example, training or operations, they retain their own internal composition and reason for being.

In Arab-majority areas such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, these councils emphasise local recruitment. According to a representative of the Hajin Military Council, most of its fighters come from the areas it covers, though recruitment patterns also reflect tribal dynamics. In eastern Deir Ezzor, the SDF has largely drawn from select Ugaydat clans (the Bukayir and Shu'aytat in particular) rather than the Obayd clan of Hajin, a reminder that the organisation’s social base is neither uniform nor politically neutral.

The councils also work hard to claim revolutionary legitimacy. A spokesman from the Hajin military council told me that roughly 80 per cent of its personnel were former Free Syrian Army fighters, with the remainder consisting of regime defectors or civilians who had not previously taken up arms. This narrative matters in regions where the 2011 uprising still carries moral weight.

Officially, the military councils endorse the SDF’s ideological vision of a decentralised Syria and insist they enjoy popular support. Critics disagree. Activists opposed to the SDF argue that what exists in Arab-majority areas is not consent but enforced quiet. One activist from Hajin in Deir Ezzor governorate, now living outside SDF control, described the situation as “temporary silence”, sustained by US backing and economic necessity. Another activist from Gharanij (another town in Deir Ezzor) put it more bluntly: “No one here is happy except those who benefit from the system”.

Still, large-scale defections have not followed. In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, there was a brief revolutionary momentum that may have encouraged some SDF members to reconsider earlier compromises. Turki al-Dhari, a former head of the al-Kasra Military Council, explained his defection to the government side at the time as a “return to the embrace of the revolution,” echoing long-standing grievances about Arab marginalisation within the SDF.

But such cases have remained the exception. SDF representatives offer several explanations. The Hajin Military Council spokesman told me that defectors acted out of fear, haste, or external pressure. He also cited concerns about Islamic State infiltration of government forces, the risk of abandoning one’s home, and uncertainty over the fate of those who defect.

Some of these concerns are not hypothetical. Al-Dhari himself survived an assassination attempt in Deir Ezzor in March 2025 and continues to be denounced by some as a traitor for having joined the SDF in the first place. There is also a quieter deterrent: the widespread belief that families of defectors may face suspicion or retaliation from the SDF.

Beyond fear, there is inertia. For many SDF members in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, continued affiliation provides income, status, and a degree of protection in a context where alternatives remain unclear. As long as negotiations between the SDF and Damascus over the implementation of the 10 March agreement remain unresolved, waiting is rational.

The core disagreement between Damascus and the SDF remains intact: the SDF seeks to retain military and administrative autonomy, while the government insists on a centralised state. Whether the outcome resembles Iraqi Kurdistan-style autonomy or individual-level integration into state institutions, many locals currently working with the SDF calculate that staying put for now maximises their chances of securing a role in the future order.

This may well change though if Damascus clearly signals that it will launch a major military offensive against the SDF in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, in which case any existing contacts between central government supporters and members of the military councils will likely be intensified with the aim of securing defections at 'zero hour'. In the face of real military pressure, it is doubtful whether the councils would fight to preserve the SDF's position.