A Kurdish perspective on the SDF-Damascus agreement
5. February 2026
In the Kurdish street, the SDF–Damascus deal is not the end of the story but the beginning of a new chapter. It begins with stopping bloodshed and averting mass displacement, and ends with achieving political decentralisation by political means.
One thing is certain: the agreement signed between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces does not fulfil Kurdish demands at the popular level. Yet it is viewed, in equal measure, as an exceptional and interim arrangement to secure a minimum degree of stability and to avert an open confrontation that would exact a heavy price from the Kurds in displacement, forced migration and mass killing. Among Kurdish communities, the agreement is therefore seen as an entry point for building a new relationship with Damascus that is grounded in the same long-standing demands, but pursued through different means that take account of the surrounding political, social and regional shifts.
Security guarantees
It almost goes without saying that a ceasefire is the most vital element of this agreement. It curbs the risk of an identity-based explosion in the region and prevents communal fighting between Kurds and Arabs. From the perspective of the Kurdish street, there is an ethical imperative to treat the agreement as an opportunity for everyone to emerge a winner, so that a process that begins with the injection of calm and the saving of lives can end with the integration of security and civilian institutions.
One outcome of this phase has been a renewed affirmation of a long-held Kurdish conviction: that Kurdish youth should not be drawn into conflicts outside their own regions. This demand has consistently been a point of contention with the SDF, particularly over the deployment of Kurdish fighters to Arab cities such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Halting the drain of Kurdish lives beyond their home areas is therefore regarded as a tangible achievement and has been received positively at the grassroots.
The consolidation of the SDF’s structure as a unified military force organised through clear brigades – rather than individual, piecemeal integration – is viewed as a strategic defensive gain. This is especially so given the continued role of the Asayish as security forces controlling internal security in Kurdish towns and cities, even if formally placed within the framework of Syria’s General Security. Equally important is the retention of employees of the Autonomous Administration within their institutions, avoiding the sweeping purges witnessed in other parts of Syria. This has provided social protection for thousands of families and functions as a crucial social safeguard for Kurdish society. It aligns with the Kurds’ repeated calls for decentralisation; this undeclared decentralisation, imperfect as it may be, represents a practical guarantee of social security.
A step towards political decentralisation
At the same time, it is essential to note that Kurdish society remains fully convinced that political decentralisation and the constitutional enshrinement of Kurdish rights constitute the definitive solution to its cause. The fear that this agreement may prove temporary persists. Yet the pressing need for security guarantees has led many to accept the agreement in its current form, while deferring further negotiations to the Kurdish delegation that emerged from the Conference for the Unity of the Kurdish Position held in April 2025.
Should the agreement fail, the risks would extend far beyond a return to armed clashes. A collapse would undermine social trust and open the door to wider regional interventions, especially by Turkey. For this reason, holding fast to the agreement may offer a rational pathway to transform a security truce into a political process that links full Kurdish rights with the preservation of Syria’s unity. This will mean a new foundation of partnership that ensures pluralism, democracy and equal citizenship for all.
In conclusion, the Kurdish popular movement has a critical role to play in developing this security agreement: by demanding international oversight to guarantee the continuity of the ceasefire; by insisting on a clear timetable for any constitutional process or institutional integration; and by securing explicit constitutional guarantees for political decentralisation. Only then can this agreement become a first building block in the construction of a unified, just Syrian state that is capable of embracing its diversity; a state in which the true victors are the people, in all their components, not the merchants of war, incitement and hatred.
