Syria’s secret weapon

17. November 2026

Israel has destroyed much of Syria’s arsenal, but canny diplomacy can still turn the country’s geography into a source of strength.

Some political analysts predict that Israel will occupy southern Syria and even march on Damascus. They have plenty to point to: Netanyahu’s struggle to retain power and assemble a governing coalition; his rivalry with Eisenkot’s camp; the temptation to escape his looming trials through another military adventure; demands from Israel’s Druze that he rescue Hijri and his would-be state of Bashan; and his courtship of Lieberman’s party, whose leader has openly advocated expanding Israel into southern Syria.

There are also reports of efforts to assemble a new “Lahad army” in southern Syria, modelled on Israel’s former proxy force in southern Lebanon. Behind all this lies the dream of a Greater Israel, alongside Netanyahu’s personal ambition to become the heir to Moses, or perhaps Ben-Gurion.

Under Assad, Syrians might have met an Israeli invasion with silence, reasoning that colonial rule could scarcely be crueller than their own dictatorship. In the words of the Greek poet Cavafy, the barbarians were “a kind of solution”. But Assad fled like a frightened cat before the fury of the Syrian people, abandoning his family photographs and leaving his father’s grave unguarded.

Israel has since destroyed much of Syria’s military arsenal. Judged by its remaining tanks and artillery, the country looks defenceless. Yet Syria has faced such a predicament before, and its history offers a lesson in how quickly a capable politician can turn military weakness into a diplomatic opening.

Playing Washington and Moscow

In 1961, Syria was similarly bereft of heavy weapons, which Gamal Abdel Nasser had ‘transferred’ to Egypt during the two countries’ short-lived union. In his memoirs, Maarouf al-Dawalibi, then Syria’s prime minister, recalled that Israel had massed 100 tanks and 200 armoured vehicles south of Tiberias, and as many again to the north. They threatened to invade the Golan Heights. 

Having broken off relations with Britain and France, the old rivals for influence in Damascus, Syria had only Moscow and Washington to approach. Dawalibi understood that both had a vested interest in keeping Syria on side. He tried the Soviets first, persuading Khrushchev that imposing socialism on Syria would do little for Soviet interests, and playing on his fears of Nasser’s alliance with the US. Khrushchev agreed to supply Syria with weapons.  

With Kennedy, he reversed the argument. The prospect of Syria becoming a communist satellite helped persuade the US president to appoint an ambassador to Damascus. According to Dawalibi, Kennedy promptly sent him ten names to choose from. He picked Ridgway Knight.

The new ambassador took up his appointment on a Sunday, dispensing with what Dawalibi describes as the customary month’s wait between arrival and the presentation of credentials. Their meeting lasted four hours. Dawalibi stipulated that Knight convey their conversation to Kennedy in person, for fear of “Jewish ears”, and only if he found the argument wholly convincing.

Knight promptly returned to Washington. In Dawalibi’s telling, the bargain was Syrian neutrality in exchange for American financial assistance and diplomatic support, alongside the collection of $100 million in fees for the American Tapline oil pipeline. Kennedy agreed. Even Omar Abu Risha, Syria’s ambassador in Washington, was astonished by Dawalibi’s diplomatic cunning.

Syria’s empty arsenals had given Dawalibi little to negotiate with in military terms. Its location, political alignment and role as a route for oil gave him considerably more. He collected the price of Syria not fully aligning with any one superpower. 

Alarmed by Syria’s growing diplomatic standing, Israel sent troops across the border in March 1962, only to lose numerous armoured vehicles to Syrian artillery fire and mines laid along their route. At least one AMX-13 tank and several half-tracks were paraded through Damascus as evidence of a Syrian defensive victory at the Battle of Nairab Hill.

Dawalibi’s success offered little protection at home, however. A coup against President Nazim al-Qudsi put him in prison. He was eventually released, and further machinations, attributed to Nasser, produced a government headed by the left-wing Bashir al-Azma, with Qudsi restored to the presidency.

The value of geography

Under Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria has overthrown its dictatorship, returned to the Arab fold, established ties with Moscow and Washington, and secured some financial assistance. Its arsenal, however, remains largely empty. Beyond Turkish small arms and light armoured vehicles, it has acquired little, despite Moscow’s offer to sell weapons and Washington’s lifting of a decades-long arms embargo.

Dawalibi’s experience suggests how Syria might improve its position. Its neighbours and the powers beyond all have interests bound up with its future. Its territory connects Turkey to the Arab world and Iraq to the Mediterranean; its stability affects countries well beyond its borders. A government able to turn those interests into concrete bargains can secure money, diplomatic protection and, eventually, the means to defend itself.

Israel continues to push into Syrian territory and may be tempted to go further. Yet the present imbalance of power need not be permanent. Syria’s secret weapon is its geopolitical position, which in the hands of canny politicians, backed by a people unwilling to submit, can change the country’s fortunes.

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A Syrian writer

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