Syria should not intervene in Lebanon. Here’s why

Today, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa finds himself between a rock and a hard place. He is torn between a war-weary populace and a belligerent Trump who wants Syria to intervene in Lebanon.

Since June, the US president has made repeated statements -including next to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun earlier this month-that the Syrian army should confront Hezbollah. He’s even gone so far as to claim that al-Sharaa has been receptive to his demands.

Since May, when the Syrian army deployed thousands of troops to the Lebanese border, Syrian officials -including al-Sharaa himself- have repeatedly denied intentions to intervene in their neighbor’s sovereign affairs. 

According to recent polls, a majority of Syrians (63 percent) firmly reject any intervention in Lebanon, as do their Lebanese counterparts, with only 2 percent saying Syria should play an active role. Any potential ‘consent’ by the Lebanese government for Syrian involvement would clearly lack popular legitimacy.

The arguments against a Syrian intervention are seemingly endless. For decades, Syria interfered in Lebanon, actively fuelling its civil war, carrying out political assassinations, and, for 30 years, occupying it militarily. Any type of intervention –even if limited in scope– would provoke already sky -high anti- Syrian sentiment in Lebanon, which would fall back on its sizable Syrian refugee population.

Such an intervention would also be highly unlikely to succeed given what Hezbollah would experience as an existential threat, not unlike Syria’s Druze. The latter fought tooth and nail against Damascus’ forces a year ago. If the Syrian army was unable to defeat a handful of Druze militia –albeit with Israel on their side– it's unlikely to be able to take on Hezbollah on its home turf. Hezbollah is a highly-disciplined guerilla organisation that Israel, the region’s superpower, has not been able to defeat in three successive wars over the span of its 44 years.

Not only would a Syrian intervention be fruitless, it would be disastrously bloody and deepen the region’s sectarian wounds. Hezbollah is not only Shiite; it was also a key ally of the Assad regime and carried out summary executions of Sunni civilians in Syria. The appetite for vengeance is very real. The sectarian massacres committed by the Sunni-dominated Syrian army last year –first against the Alawites, then against the Druze– is an indication of how unpleasant it could get.

Another concern relates to Syria’s stability insofar an operation would stretch the already small Syrian army thin, in a context where a host of actors are trying to actively destabilise the country’s fragile transition however they can. Foremost among them is the Islamic State, which has carried out a spate of attacks since the beginning of the year, including this month’s bombings in the Syrian capital. However, other threats include revanchist insurgents previously aligned with the now-defunct Assad regime, as well as expanding Israeli military operations in southwestern Syria.

Ultimately, the key question for Damascus is more existential in nature: namely, whether its long-term interests vis-à-vis Israel would be best served by a military intervention. Could its complicity appease Trump and allow for lasting US assurances that Syria will not be Israel’s next target? Or could confronting Hezbollah accelerate the timeline for an Israeli intervention in Syria if the group is subdued with Damascus’ help?

Damascus needs look no further than Washington’s treatment of its Kurdish allies to understand how fickle its assurances are. US policy towards Syria’s Kurds has repeatedly flip-flopped between Republican and Democratic administrations. During his first term, Trump green lit the 2019 Turkish-backed ‘Peace Spring’ offensive against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The anti-ISIS fighting force had been formed in 2015 under the Obama administration. Then, earlier this year, the US withdrew its support for this decade-long partner, allowing the Syrian army to gain control of northeastern Syria.

It would be a fatal error for Syria to think it could be an exception to Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy - especially as it pertains to a strategic ally like Israel, to which it has provided unconditional support for decades. Personal business interests among Trump and his inner circle are not enough to anchor the US to Syria, especially after his term in office comes to an end.

The US congress is currently weighing an integration deal – known as the FUTURES Act – that would entangle the American and Israeli security sectors well beyond Trump’s presidency. It is the apex of how inextricably linked Israeli and American military establishments are and further reinforces the inertia of the endless US-backed Israeli wars in the region: Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, and, inevitably, Syria.

For Damascus, the best way to contain Israel is not to become its proxy, but to treat Hezbollah as a buffer against it. That means not intervening in Lebanon.