Three scenarios await Syria’s Kurds

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, an old chapter in Syria’s political history has forcefully reopened: the Kurdish question. The Kurds now face a defining moment. Under what conditions can they truly integrate into the new Syrian state?

The transitional government in Damascus speaks the language of pragmatism but it remains trapped in a centralist mindset that fears any meaningful form of decentralised governance. Ankara’s influence – having helped propel Sharaa to power – adds further constraints, shrinking Damascus’s room to manoeuvre on Kurdish demands. This is despite the fact that the Kurds do not challenge the new president’s authority, do not obstruct his quest for Western legitimacy, and pose no comparable security threat to extremist Islamist factions.

Three Kurdish actors have influence: the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish National Council (KNC), and, increasingly decisive, the Kurdish street – now more pragmatic than its political elites.

The Autonomous Administration and SDF reject mere symbolic integration into the new state. They speak instead of functional integration that preserves the institutions built over the past decade. Their position goes beyond cultural recognition of the Kurdish language. They seek a clear constitutional affirmation of Kurds as a people, with the right to manage their own affairs through elected institutions, possessing real legislative and executive authority in northern and eastern Syria; a multilingual education system; and a fair share of natural resources. 

On security, the SDF argues that its years of counterterrorism experience are not a “military detail” but a pillar of stability for Syria. It proposes a carefully managed integration into the new Syrian army: specialised units retained, guarantees to prevent dismantling current security structures, and joint leadership on the terrorism file.  

The KNC, meanwhile, takes a more overtly nationalist line: self-rule in majority-Kurdish areas, constitutional recognition of the Kurds as a founding component of the state, quotas in both the legislative and executive branches, and protection of Kurdish language and heritage. Yet its longstanding association with the traditional opposition – particularly the Istanbul-based National Coalition, known as the Etilaf – has eroded its credibility on the ground. 

With the National Coalition now defunct, and talks between Damascus and the SDF happening without it, the KNC has been forced into a strategic rethink: reconnect with its Kurdish support base, revive dialogue with the Autonomous Administration, and explore the possibility of a unified Kurdish delegation in negotiations with Damascus.

As for the wider Kurdish public, a decade of war has left them less enthused by slogans and more firmly attached to tangible guarantees. Their outlook is shaped by three priorities: security before politics, economic stability before grand narratives, and constitutional guarantees before unreliable promises.

The high expectations raised during the 2014–2018 debate over federalism, followed by Turkish military strikes, closed borders, economic hardship and wavering US commitment, have fostered a widespread belief that demands must be realistic – but also non-negotiable on identity and fundamental rights: constitutional recognition, mother-tongue education, clear political decentralisation, preservation of local security bodies, and a cautious, structured integration of the SDF into the new national military.

Several scenarios are now in play regarding the Kurdish relationship with Damascus:

The favourable scenario (from a Kurdish perspective): broad political decentralisation, explicit constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, real legislative and executive powers for the north and east, and sequenced integration of the SDF that preserves counterterrorism capacity and prevents a return to hyper-centralised security control.

The “incomplete” option: limited to administrative decentralisation under local governance law (Law 107), with Autonomous Administration institutions folded into local government structures but without constitutional safeguards or security autonomy. Full military integration of the SDF into the defence and interior ministries. This may satisfy Damascus and Ankara, but risks future instability. It merely recycles the logic of “managing the Kurdish issue as a security file” – a change of language but not substance.

The dangerous scenario: a military clash triggered in Manbij, Deir Ezzor or around Aleppo, exacerbated by persistent Turkish pressure, diminishing international protection for Kurdish-held areas, and the presence of undisciplined armed groups within the Syrian Army. Any such escalation would derail integration efforts and reignite displacement.

Ultimately, the onus lies as much with Damascus as with Kurdish actors. Clinging to old-style centralism and ignoring the shift in Kurdish public sentiment will merely defer the crisis and potentially trigger another round of conflict. Conversely, the Kurds recognise that maximalist nationalist ambitions are no longer feasible given current regional and global dynamics. 

The Kurdish message to Damascus and regional capitals is now clearer than ever: Syria’s stability cannot be achieved over the heads of the Kurds, but through their fair inclusion in the architecture of the new state. That means constitutional recognition, political decentralisation, and a fair distribution of wealth.