Islamists versus Islamists

A close look at the Muslim Brotherhood’s trajectory in Syria over the past fifteen years reveals a sharp decline in political, religious, social and relief influence. Politically, it failed to steer or shape the revolution, despite issuing its 2012 “Covenant and Charter” outlining a vision for a civil democratic state built on justice, accountability and national reconciliation. The document quickly disappeared from view, overwhelmed by the rise of Salafism and ignored by secular revolutionary circles. 

Although the group held numerical dominance within the Syrian National Council – established in late 2011 as the first representative opposition body – and helped choose its presidents, its influence faded rapidly within its successor, the National Coalition. Newer political figures took the helm, and decision-making ultimately concentrated in the hands of a small circle that tightened its grip on the Coalition. In the 2023 elections, the Brotherhood secured just one seat in the politburo out of 24. It secured a second only through Ankara’s intercession.

On the religious front, the Brotherhood’s impact dwindled as the simpler, more energised Salafi narrative captured the imagination of youth and opposition fighters. The Brotherhood’s elitist discourse failed to resonate with popular bases or attract the support of armed groups. It even lost Ahrar al-Sham, Islamist faction that had roots in Brotherhood-linked Damascene families. Socially, its supporters were largely urban and middle-class. It failed to penetrate rural or lower-income communities that formed the backbone of the uprising. 

In the humanitarian field, most organisations linked directly or indirectly to the Brotherhood collapsed due to dwindling funding, with many members shifting towards secular international NGOs to distance themselves from any perceived “toxic” association to the Brotherhood.

Leadership stagnation compounded these flaws. The doctrine of “consensus figures” – leaders who avoid upsetting anyone yet convince no one – kept the organisation politically inert and spiritually drained. This approach characterised the eight-year tenure of former General Supervisor Mohammad Hikmat Walid and continued under his successor, Amer al-Bouslama (aka Abu al-Miqdad), undermining any prospect of the Brotherhood playing a leading role during the revolution.

With the fall of Assad and the rise of a new regime led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Brotherhood faced an existential question: can it return to public life; or will it remain a mere witness to history?

Soon after 8 December 2024, the group began reopening offices across provinces and reconnecting with old cadres, including ageing leaders who had remained in Syria without engaging organisationally for years. Yet attracting new members – especially among youth – proved difficult. Their reluctance to appear publicly in a manner that might provoke the new regime, coupled with longstanding reliance on clandestine methods and the slow process of building trust before recruitment, further hindered expansion and impact.

In this climate, five internal factions emerged.

The first, representing senior religious figures, advocates maintaining a cautious path, warning against any confrontation with Sharaa. They repeat a wry saying: “If the Muslim cannot thrive, he should at least conceal himself.”

The second calls for total withdrawal from politics and a return to religious, social and relief work. Its members argue that post-war conditions favour moral and educational engagement and assert that political activism has become too risky after 7 October 2023 and the resultant tightening regional and international restrictions on the Brotherhood. They consider the new state a potentially viable platform for a future Islamic state, and that it is best not to rock the boat at this stage. 

The third current, led by younger members, believes that the Brotherhood’s long-awaited moment has arrived. They assert that remaining silent now would mean certain exclusion later; and they warn of the government’s drive towards exclusivity and monopolising Sunni legitimacy, claiming that it could even evolve into a Sunni monarchy. Preserving “Sunni rule”, they argue, should not imply acquiescing to personalised authoritarianism.

The fourth faction adopts a pragmatic line, urging participation within the state, seeing the institutional vacuum as an opening for co-option – especially since the government has appointed individuals with Brotherhood backgrounds to administrative posts.

The fifth and most radical faction calls for dissolving the group entirely and the launch of fresh initiatives with more flexible frameworks. It argues that the historic organisation has become a liability. Members of this group – including senior figure Mulham al-Droubi – have already staged walk outs. 

The so-called “dissolution crisis” erupted against this backdrop. It came to a head with a strongly-worded article by Ahmed Zaidan – special adviser to President Sharaa – published on Al Jazeera’s website on 22 August. He asserted that the Brotherhood should dissolve and refrain from public activity during the transitional phase, in the name of unifying efforts to rebuild the country. The article followed a wave of dissolutions of political and military entities, including of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in December 2024.

Interpretations diverged. Some saw the move as the result of Gulf demands that the Brotherhood be excluded as a condition for supporting the new Syria. Others viewed it as a direct response to the Brotherhood’s Shura Council statement of 7 August, which rejected dissolution and asserted its identity as an “independent national current”, while admitting it was not yet ready for a return to frontline politics.

Sources indicate that during summer Sharaa tasked Zaidan to persuade the Brotherhood leadership that the Islamic project had already materialised through HTS, and that dissolving the organisation would allow its members to participate in state institutions without potential complications arising from formal Brotherhood affiliation. 

The article certainly appeared to signal the end of dialogue. Informed sources in Damascus suggested to Syria in Transition that the authorities were prepared to treat the Brotherhood as they did Hizb ut-Tahrir in Idlib: cease all political activity or face imprisonment.

The Brotherhood responded promptly, denying that calls for dissolution stemmed from Gulf pressure, insisting relations with Gulf states were sound and aligned in opposing Iranian influence; and arguing that the demands were a personal move by Sharaa aimed at consolidating his authority and eliminate potential Sunni rivals. Members of the second generation of Brotherhood members felt particularly offended, seeing the article as depriving them even of an honourable exit after over eighty years of political and religious engagement in public life.

Amid the tension, the Brotherhood issued a “Coexistence Document” on 18 October, comprising a vision for a democratic state premised on political pluralism and peaceful transfer of power. The document – believed to have been authored by Mohammad Hikmat Walid and Ahmad al-Dahir – countered calls for dissolution and positioned the Brotherhood as offering a more politically balanced alternative to Salafi governance models. 

The document nevertheless faced criticism for omitting explicit reference to judicial independence and failing to enshrine freedom of thought as a foundational principle. It focused instead on freedom of belief and media, rendering it more a moral declaration than a fully developed constitutional framework. Some Kurdish voices lamented that the document missed a major opportunity by not proposing the name “Syrian Republic”, without “Arab”, a formulation many Syrian Brotherhood members are known to accept.

The Muslim Brotherhood didn’t take part in October’s elections and didn’t encourage its members – or the broader public – to participate, their abstention likely stemming from deep resentment at the government’s demand that the organisation dissolve itself. Yet the results served the Brotherhood’s interests handsomely.

The majority of successful candidates, though not formal Brotherhood members were either sympathisers of political Islam or conservative figures whose views sit close to those of the Brotherhood. While the Salafi-jihadist current represented by HTS consolidated its hold over the executive branch, political Islam in its broader sense scored a victory at the legislative level. This has unsettled officials in Damascus, and may explain the delayed announcement of the president’s own list of appointees (70 in total.) In addition to ensuring representation for women and minorities, he must now balance Sunni representation away from the Brotherhood and its fellow-travellers. Many of the new MPs are veterans of the early days of the Syrian uprising, and thus difficult for the government to corral.

Nowhere did the Brotherhood’s perceived resurgence make a stronger impression than in Aleppo. There, the list headed by Azzam al-Khanji – hailing from a well-known Brotherhood family – swept the largest electoral district in the country. Three of the candidates on his list were themselves sons of prominent Brotherhood figures. Yet the victory seems to owe less to ideological affinity than to the practical services Khanji and his colleagues provided in rural Aleppo during the uprising, especially in the field of education.

Results elsewhere showed a similar pattern. Across Syria, more than 25 winning candidates have some familial tie to the Brotherhood through fathers, uncles or maternal relatives. Among these are Rifaa Akrama in Latakia, and Nader Sanoofa in Homs. In Damascus, meanwhile, the elections brought sweeping triumph for a coalition of neighbourhood notables and figures associated with the Zayd Mosque, long regarded as a hotbed of religiously-inspired political action. This outcome has rattled the authorities and buoyed the Brotherhood, particularly in the major cities.

Today, the Brotherhood confronts a new reality: a Sunni-led regime unwilling to tolerate Sunni competition, a war-weary society craving stability over ideological projects, and an organisation split between survival, renewal and dissolution; and all this as a debate intensifies over Arab regimes-style “official Islam” run by the state, versus “political Islam” run by the Brotherhood. A slowly simmering internal Islamist rupture may be on the cards.

As perhaps the only organised Sunni group with financial networks and a long history of activism, the Brotherhood's return to the political centre stage is not an outlandish prospect. Syria’s urban Sunnis still look towards political currents capable of blending Islamic principles with operational flexibility – minus the Salafist dogma. The Brotherhood – ironically – may become a factor in steering Sunni society towards religious moderation and political pluralism.

What is required is the emergence of a “political saviour” who can marry structural reform with identity preservation – as Sharaa did for the Salafi-jihadist current – and challenge the new regime without being reckless. Presently, there is no obvious candidate for the role; but that doesn’t mean that one will not emerge from the Brotherhood’s younger cadres.